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Abstract
In this thesis, a completely revisited data protection scheme based on selective encryption is
presented. First, this new scheme is agnostic in term of data format, second it has a parallel
architecture using GPGPU allowing performance to be at least comparable to full encryption
algorithms.
Bitmap, as a special uncompressed multimedia format, is addressed as a first use case.
Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) is the first transformation for splitting fragments, getting
data protection, and storing data separately on local device and cloud servers. This work
has largely improved the previous published ones for bitmap protection by providing new
designs and practical experimentations. General purpose graphic processing unit (GPGPU)
is exploited as an accelerator to guarantee the efficiency of the calculation compared with
traditional full encryption algorithms. Then, an agnostic selective encryption based on
lossless Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT) is presented. This design, with practical exper-
imentations on different hardware configurations, provides strong level of protection and
good performance at the same time plus flexible storage dispersion schemes. Therefore, our
agnostic data protection and transmission solution combining fragmentation, encryption, and
dispersion is made available for a wide range of end-user applications. Also a complete set
of security analysis are deployed to test the level of provided protection.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
In the last two decades, digital data has increased in a very large scale in many fields. In 2008,
International Data Corporation (IDC) estimated 2.25×1021 bits of digital information had
been created [12]. This amount would surpass 6×1023 bits by 2023. More importantly, for
the personal users, the latest advances of information technology (IT) including computers,
smart phones and tablets make it very easy to generate data to distribute. For example,
nowadays 72 hours of videos are uploaded to YouTube in every minute on average [103].
Therefore, the data being generated, processed, transmitted and distributed is massive through
the Internet.
Both large scale parallel multi-core machines and more efficient and affordable PCs were
built to serve generating, transmitting, storing and computing digital data. One of the most
important advance in distributed systems is to link smaller, more affordable servers together
to build a large scale computer cluster for data service. The main advantage of Cloud is to
offer more scalable, fault-tolerant services with high performance at a low cost compared
with one super computer. Moreover, Cloud computing technology can basically provide
almost infinite computing and storage resources on demand that can fits both individual
users and companies by renting hardware resources remotely on a short-term basis (most
commonly, a number of processors by the hour and storage space by the day). Therefore,
cloud users enjoy the variety of cloud services (e.g. Data as a Service (Daas), Software as a
Service (SaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS), Infrastructure as a service (IaaS), etc).
With both the development of digital data and computer technology, the trends in recent
years is to outsource information storage and processing to cloud-based services. Especially
the cloud-based data storage services for individual users are gaining popularity. Relying on
large free storage space and reliable communication channel, cloud-based service providers
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like Dropbox, Google Drive are providing individual users almost infinite and low cost
storage space.
However, this situation raises a question of the trustworthiness of cloud-based service
providers. In fact, many security and privacy incidents are observed in today’s Cloud-based
systems. Some of these incidents are listed in [187]:
• Steven Warshak stops the government’s repeated secret searches and seizures of his
stored email using the federal Stored Communications Act (SCA) in July, 2007.
• A Salesforce.com employee fell victim to a phishing attack and leaked a customer list,
which generated further targeted phishing attacks in October 2007.
• Google Docs found a flaw that inadvertently shares users docs in March 2009.
• Epic.com lodged a formal complaint to the FTC against Google for its privacy practices
in March 2009. EPIC was successful in an action against Microsoft Passport.
• Yahoo confirmed that at least 500 million user accounts has been stolen from the
company’s network in late 2014.
• Equifax announced that 143 million US-based users had their credit history information
compromised in 2017.
Most of these incidents are due to human errors. Moreover, the cloud providers themselves
cannot be trusted either. In 2013, the PRISM surveillance program [54] was exposed. In this
program, the NSA has obtained direct access to the systems of Google, Facebook, Apple
and other US Internet giants which made privacy of individual users’ data vulnerable. This
is due to the data that transmitted to the cloud will be handled by the Cloud itself. The
situation could be even worse in some specific use cases like outsourcing encryption shown
in Xiang et al. [175] (the client need to outsource protected images to other users through
an insecure channel but does not have sufficiently computational power or energy supply
to perform the encryption). Thus, it becomes increasingly important for users to efficiently
protect their personal data(texts, images, or videos) independently from the storage or any
other application or service providers.
So, in this work, one basic assumption is that Cloud service providers cannot be entirely
trusted. We have to assume that one ’curious’ or ’malicious’ program sits on at least one
Cloud server and is able to observe all the data stored in the Cloud and transmitted through
the Cloud. In a worse case, all data stored on the Cloud server can be used by this program
to sniff the user’s privacy by any means of analysis or attack for even a small piece of data.
More importantly, the data transmission channel is also not perfectly protected and more
threats like crackers could compromise the data on it. And the only trustworthy area is the
local machine one end-user has. In this thesis, the design for the data stored in local machines
includes encryption algorithms applied so even stealing data from local machine is not a
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threat. And another basic assumption is there is no such situation that a malicious program
stays on end-user’s computer and can observe all data in the process.
One reasonable solution is to protect the data locally on an end-user’s machine before it
is sent to Cloud servers. And this makes encryption naturally become promising. Traditional
encryption systems like the standard cipher symmetric key encryption systems (e.g. 3DES,
or its successor AES, etc.) work with the assumption that data are sequence of symbols
relatively independent (i.i.d.) and of even importance and indeed, that the data must be
decrypted with accuracy. This typically does not apply to most of the personal data that are
photos and videos: pixels are known to be highly correlated with theirs neighbors and there
is well-known strong inter-frame correlation as well. The spatial or temporal redundancies of
these multimedia data are not sufficiently exploited by historical encryption methods, as when
they are designed, multimedia data with special formats are still rare. For example, users
may even tolerate some small level of distortion in some cases when deciphering an image
with a moderate requirement on its rendition [80]. Another problem is that the traditional
encryption methods are not enough to protect: for instance, an image has been encrypted
rowwise by means of AES can let element of the structure of an image still understandable
(see Fig. 1 of [64]).
Some other data protection methods like Selective Encryption (SE) have been published
in recent decades. The aim at exploiting special redundancies of multimedia data and are
based on compression algorithms. SE usually dedicated to image or video protection where
they support to automatically separate the image or video into two fragments: a ‘private’
fragment which contains most of the information such that this fragment is sufficient to
understand the original image or at least process some exploitation, a second fragment that
we call ‘public’ which is supposed to contain a much smaller amount of information such
that this fragment is not exploitable. These two fragments are protected using different
approaches depending on their respective levels of importance or confidentiality. The state of
the art in Selective Encryption methods is showing that all these methods propose to encrypt
the private fragment as a small subset of the original content [101] which in some cases
constitutes a lightweight and fast encryption compared with a full encryption. This raises a
first issue consisting in determining the optimal private fragment which first, deserves strong
protection and secondly, is as small as possible. Then we face a second issue consisting in
making sure that the weak level of protection we apply to the public fragment will prevent
leaks of useful information.
Not every SE used image compression transforms, for instance, one very simple answer
would be to encrypt the center of the image, leaving the border in clear (see Figure 4 in [137]
for instance). This simple solution can be considered for lightweight protection, however,
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it does not address our two issues since the border of the image may leak valuable key
information. A more interesting one is to use transformations used in image compression
algorithms such as the Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) (see [80] or our own work in [126]
for instance) to separate the information in the frequency domain.
Although the SE methods are more suitable for multimedia data in some cases, there
are limitations , for instance, most SE methods are specifically related to the format of data
(bitmap, jpeg) they are dealing with. Once SE method is designed based on the compression
methods or coding technology used, it is dedicated for a specific multimedia content only.
More importantly, there are some large volume data transmitted today that are not compressed
or cannot be compressed to save storage spaces like an operating system image. It is not
efficient to exploit many SE methods according to many different multimedia data formats.
Thus, a challenge comes up that if it is possible to design an efficient SE method that can
generally fits all kinds of data formats and guarantee not only security but also data integrity.
1.2 Motivation
As pointed before, outsourcing information storage and processing, cloud-based services for
data storage have gained in popularity and today can be considered as mainstream. They
attract organizations or enterprises especially individual users who do not want or cannot
cope with the cost of a private cloud. Beside the economic factor, both groups of customers
subordinate their choice of an adequate cloud provider to other factors, particularly resilience,
security, and privacy.
Hardening data protection using multiple methods rather than ‘just’ encryption is be-
coming of paramount importance when considering continuous and powerful attacks to
spy, alter, or even destroy information. Even if encryption is a great technology rapidly
progressing, encryption is ‘just’ not enough to progress with this unsolvable question not
mentioning its high computational complexity. In [2], the authors showed how to compromise
https sites with 512-bit group; the authors even suggested that 1024-bit encryption could be
crypt-analyzed with enough computational power. Cryptograph never like the idea that a
cipher can be broken and information can be read given sufficient computational resources
[106], this is nevertheless one of the central design tenets of a number of projects like the
Potshards system [146]. Moreover, there remains the difficult question of the management of
the encryption key that over time, can be known by too many people, and stolen or lost.
One ultimate purpose and ambition is to look at data protection and privacy from end to
end by way of combining fragmentation, encryption, and then dispersion [105, 104]. This
means to derive general schemes and architecture to protect data during their entire life
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cycle everywhere they go throughout a network of machines where they are being processed,
transmitted, and stored. Moreover, it is to offer users choices among various well understood
cost effective levels of privacy and security which would come with predictable levels of
performance in terms of memory occupation, energy consumption, and processing time.
However, in order to provide a practical method for protecting data during their storage,
we will set a series of assumptions for the hardware and software environment that is the
end-users have a resource limited personal environment like laptops or desktops. Moreover,
the execution time has to be comparable to the traditional full encryption algorithms. To
verify this point, we will need to setup a benchmark.
Also, the concept of ’Fragmentation’ is introduced with a different usage. Normally
fragmentation is vastly used for resilience purposes. In [128], one of the first results about
fragmenting for both fault-tolerance and data protection is found. In [75], the authors address
this question by using a Reed Solomon error correcting code [129] to avoid mere duplication.
In summary, fragmentation means separating with a more or less complex algorithm data into
pieces or fragments for resilience purposes. In this thesis, we redefine the fragmentation as
separating a piece of data by considering difference in confidentiality, data nature and space
usage, in order to protect the fragments differently according to their level of confidentiality
or criticality. For instance, the uncompressed image is containing a lot of redundancy that
encryption only a small part of the low frequency coefficients can effectively reduce the
image quality. Then these fragments should in turn be stored in different physical locations
in a more or less sophisticated manner in order to increase the level of protection for the
whole information.
Defining different levels of data importance is based on the thesis that massive amount
of data have a non-uniform level of criticality or confidentiality (therefore, a non-uniform
need for protection). In fact, non-uniform distribution of data is the basis of compression and
only pure white noise is uniformly distributed. Also, as data has not been produced at the
same time, they are aging at a non-uniform pace which again relate to the non-uniform level
of criticality and a need for a multilevel security system. This makes the idea of combining
fragmentation with encryption possible by letting some critical data be separated and strongly
encrypted, while some other data less critical be only fragmented and possibly more rapidly
encrypted with a weaker encryption algorithm or even in some use cases, let clear.
Last but not least, by definition, fragmentation enables the parallelization of transforming
or encrypting pieces of information which lets us expect strong gain in efficiency compared
with a full encryption sequentially executed, addressing scalability requirements. Defrag-
mentation could then have to follow a reverse parallel pattern.
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Then the other basic assumption is the need for a trusted area. Whatever is the software
solution used for protecting data, it is our belief that a complete solution will have to use
hardened hardware (a trusted area of one or several machines) at one critical moment or
another during the data life cycle. In particular, places where information is being fragmented
or defragmented, encrypted or decrypted are particularly critical since the information is
gathered in clear during a period of time. Also, places where information is being created,
printed out, or visualized by a human end-user have to be trusted and protected from any
uninvited observer. A last, reason for considering a trusted area would be to use it as a safe
and store ultra-confidential information even as this information is strongly encrypted. This
point is widely recognized since a long time and in many publications [51] or [3] for instance)
or by many industry experts. In fact, most of the trusted area are just relatively more secure
than the others while there is a race between the crackers and protection technology. In order
to save the endless challenges about whether a storage space is a trusted area, we define in
this thesis that the local area is trustworthy compared with the cloud storage space while all
data stored locally are still encrypted at application layer by default.
Use cases are important since a specific architecture can comply with a set of use cases
but at the same time may very well fail at addressing needs for another group of use cases.
Use cases can be defined according to the number of desired authorized participants (one,
two, or many), their roles as users or end-users (owner, author (who may not be the owner),
read-only user, service provider,. . . ) (aka Alice and Bob), the number and type of attackers
(from honest but curious, eavesdropper (aka Eve), to malicious (aka Mallory), insider, man
in the middle, coalition of attackers, powerful rogue enterprise,. . . ), the type and location of
attacks (at storage, transmission, processing time, . . . ), the size, nature, and format of the
data (image, video, text, database, unstructured data,. . . ), the kind of distributed machine
environments (one machine to another machine, one personal machine (from a laptop to a
mobile device like smart phone or a tablet) to one cloud, a general distributed environment
involving several providers,..). We can see by combining these various possibilities that use
cases can be very contrasted and their number can be relatively large.
We consider the use case with relatively simplified situation: an end-user (Alice) wants
to save her multimedia data in a public cloud in order to save memory in her private resource-
limited environment (be a desktop, a laptop, or even a smart phone), however, for privacy
reasons, she does not want putting her entire data either in plain-text or encrypted in the
hands one storage provider. The solution is quite straight forward that is to protect the data on
the private resource-limited environment that end-users have with all the possible calculation
resources to achieve a reasonable performance.
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In this thesis, we first present the related work mainly around the notion of Selective
Encryption (SE) methods which are designed for specific multimedia contents in Chapter
2. The performance issue and the limitations are given to illustrate weakness of most SE
methods. Then in Chapter 3, we introduce the hardware level discussion, mainly the idea of
using General Purpose Graphic Unit (GPGPU) which is original for SE methods. Of course
GPGPU behave as an accelerator for the methods designed in subsequent chapters but they
also have an issue of portability that we will discuss. In Chapter 4, a special use case of
bitmap image is considered as the data need to be protected. All design and implementation
details are given with benchmark evaluations. In Chapter 5, we upgrade methods of Chapter 4
to fit with agnostic fashion of data by not only design with practical concerns but also parallel
implementations partly on a CPU, partly on a GPU. We analyze in details of performance,
security, and integrity issues, and describe how our SE methods can be used to safely store
public fragments in public storage systems. Then we conclude in Chapter 6 with future
works.
1.2.1 Benchmark problem
Benchmark is critical and is a key rationale [121] for developing protection methods. There
are very little research that thoroughly investigate performance of existing specific SE
methods in a practical way [77]. One main reason is that some SE works are integrated
within the compression or encoding algorithms which authorize authors to simply ignore
possible delay caused by the first step of SE methods since they are shared. This unpractical
issue is explained in Chapter 2.4.3 within a real end user environment. Moreover, most of
the SE methods are not comparable with traditional full encryption algorithms like AES
implemented with state of the art hardware or software, or are not considering the huge
progression in performance caused by constantly evolving hardware.
In fact, it is easy to assume that encrypting a small part of the data ought to be faster than
doing it in full based on the syntax ’selective’ encryption. However, the gain in performance
is not that obvious, as this approach may adds a pre-processing phase of data analysis and
splitting that could lead to overall worse performance than full encryption. We propose to
benchmark these methods from an end-user viewpoint: from the moment he is starting the
operation of protection to the moment his data is protected (this is an end to end consideration)
and compare the method with a full encryption (today, AES)–Of course, this comparison
must use similar hardware.
The need for regularly performing benchmarking is enforced by the fast pace progression
of various hardware architecture (particularly GPU architectures) and software implemen-
tations of full encryption methods (for instance, there is a clear acceleration from AES to
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AES-NI [17]). These changes of hardware architecture and software algorithms may very
well change the ranking of the various methods and ultimately, change the end-user decision.
This is why we pay attention to the implementation of these methods and test on different
hardware environment. For example, even with the GPU acceleration, we have to recognize
that performance for GPU implementation is still not just a simple software coding but, in
fact, a particular implementation could reach best in class performance on a given platform
but not on another one [37].
It is important to consider performance as a key factor to determine whether the SE
method is practical. Also the possible changes caused by hardware upgrade and software
optimization still need to be considered and discussed as they may change the whole design.
In summary, we are showing the possibility of using the SE methods in a practical way rather
than giving an ultimate solution for end-user data protection use case.
1.2.2 Security analysis
Attack resistance is, in our opinion, another key rationale even if a number of authors accept
to present SE as a compromise between security and performance and categorize SE as a
lightweight security process. Most of the state of the art papers we have seen in [101] or later
are mostly looking at visual degradation. It is fair to consider only the visual degradation
for the image case as it it the most important standard. Just like in Chapter 4 we show
the protection for bitmap format is analyzed with mainly the traditional visual degradation.
However, for an agnostic SE methods, more requirements are needed including statistical
analysis based on frequency analysis, correlation analysis, entropy analysis, differential
analysis and whether subject to a possible avalanche effect (resisting to error propagation).
This is done in Chapter 5 where we use different file formats to test the design.
In fact, as the design in this thesis is based on the fragmentation for the data, there will
be fragments with different security levels and dispersed on different locations. For the most
important fragment, the protection method is the traditional full encryption (can be easily
replaced with any other protection methods) and the storage place is considered as secure so
the security analysis is omitted. The fragments that are transmitted and stored on the Cloud
servers are the part that needs security analysis.
In Chapter 5, we present figures for the security analysis for one case and some statistical
results in tables for many times repeated tests. As long as different file formats are used,
some criteria like PSNR and SSIM just suit for images are not used for other file formats
like texts. And some compressed multimedia data is also used for test but just with a general
statistical analysis.
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In summary, all core purposes of security analysis is to prove no matter what kind of
plain texts are the input, the output cipher texts ought to be as close as possible to the ideal
random data. And as the encryption key is introduced in Chapter 5 for the protection of the
data stored locally, the sensitivity analysis of the key is also needed to prove the resistance
for attacks like chosen plain text attack.

Chapter 2
Data protection methods
In this chapter, firstly, basic introduction of secure storage and secure computation is given.
A small test for FHE accelerated by GPGPU is also presented. Then, selective encryption, a
special data protection method normally for multimedia data, is introduced and discussed.
At last, our selective encryption approach is given.
2.1 Secure storage and secure computation
Three main functions are required to protect digital data during its life cycle: secure storage,
secure computing and secure sharing. One of the most promising method for securing
computing is Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) which provides full privacy during the
whole computing process for the encrypted data. And the most popular technology for data
storage and sharing is Cloud computing, which offers several benefits like fast development,
pay-for-use and lower costs, scalability, rapid provisioning, greater resiliency, low-cost
disaster recovery, and data storage solutions. With over three decades long, outsourcing
information storage and processing, cloud-based services for data storage have gained
in popularity and today can be considered as mainstream. They attract organizations or
enterprises as well as end users who do not want or cannot cope with the cost of a private
cloud.
The cloud offers all these advantages, however, this is not without taking cloud computing
needs to move the application data or databases to large data centers, where the operation
and management of the data and services are not trustworthy [122].
Hardening data protection using multiple methods rather than ‘just’ encryption is becom-
ing of paramount importance when considering continuous and powerful attacks to spy, alter,
or even destroy private and confidential information. Even if encryption is a great technol-
ogy rapidly progressing, encryption is ‘just’ not enough to progress with this unsolvable
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question not mentioning its high computational complexity. In [2], the author shows how to
compromise Diffie-Hellman key exchange (used in https sites) with 512-bit group. It is also
shown that 1024-bit encryption could be cryptanalyzed with enough computational power.
Cryptographs never like the idea that a cipher can be broken and information can be read
given sufficient computational resources [106], this is nevertheless one of the central design
tenets of a number of projects like the Potshards system [146]. Moreover, there remains the
difficult question of the management of the encryption key that over time, can be known by
too many people, and stolen or lost.
Our purpose and ultimate ambition is to look at data protection and privacy from end
to end by way of combining fragmentation, encryption, and then dispersion. This means
to derive general schemes and architecture to protect data during their entire life cycle
everywhere they go throughout a network of machines where they are being processed,
transmitted, and stored. Moreover, it is to offer end users choices among various well
understood cost effective levels of privacy and security which would come with predictable
levels of performance in terms of memory occupation and processing time. For this thesis,
we aim to provide secure data storage scheme for end users with reasonable assumptions that
end users will have a resource limited personal environment and will look at a honest but
curious third party cloud storage provider with a cost effectiveness additional constraint.
2.2 Fully homomorphic encryption
2.2.1 What is FHE
Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) is a concept asked in 1978 by Rivest et al. [134] and
answered by Gentry [55]. This concept can be described as “is there a way that delegates
processing of your data, without giving away access to it”.We immediately understand the
value proposition of such encryption algorithms even before considering outsourcing or
public cloud computing since it is about performing computation with encrypted data in
perfect security. The trustworthiness question in cloud computing has been discussed for
years and today, there is still no perfect solution. FHE could very well be this ‘perfect
solution’ only once proven efficient from a performance point of view which depends upon
the use case under consideration.
Fig. 2.1 shows how FHE can be used with a cloud server to compute the value of a
function f for a data Data : the user Alice sends the encrypted Data (encrypted with Key)
and the function f (the calculation Alice wants) to the cloud and the cloud will receive only
the encrypted Data and the function f. The property of FHE allows the cloud to perform the
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computation on encrypted Data with the Evaluate function (shown in Fig 2.1, compute on
ciphertext) without knowing or accessing to Data. Alice will be able to decrypt ’evaluated’
Data with the corresponding Key’ and get the result f(Data). This process is basically shown
as the equation below:
Evaluate( f ,Encrypt(Data)) = Encrypt(Evaluate( f ,Data)) (2.1)
Fig. 2.1 General concept of how FHE works.
Other encryption algorithms are known for having somewhat homomorphic property (see
Wikipedia [170]). For instance, RSA is homomorphic with regards to multiplication: If the
RSA public key is modulus m and exponent e, then the encryption of a message x is given by:
ε(x) = xemod(m) (2.2)
The homomorphic property for the multiplication is then:
ε(x1) · ε(x2) = (xe1 · xe2)mod(m) = (x1x2)emod(m) = ε(x1 · x2) (2.3)
which means if the evaluation function is multiply, the RSA has property of homomorphic.
2.2.2 Related work of FHE
Since 2009 when FHE based on ideal lattice was introduced by Gentry [55], three main
branches of FHE schemes have been developed: lattice-based, integer-based and learning-
with-errors (LWE) or ring-learning-with-errors (RLWE) based encryption.
The main focus of the theoretical cryptographic research community is currently on LWE
and RLWE based FHE (Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan [18], Gentry et al. [57], Gentry
et al. [58]). LWE based was introduced by Regev [130], and has been shown to be as hard
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as the worst case lattice problems. This problem has been extended to work over rings
by Lyubashevsky et al. [95], and this extension increases the efficiency of LWE.
Integer based schemes were introduced by Van Dijk et al. [159] as a theoretically sim-
pler alternative to lattice based schemes and have been further developed to offer similar
performance to existing lattice based schemes by Coron et al. [34], Coron et al. [35].
Despite different math basis have different performance, none of them is efficient enough
for applications with time constraints. For example, key generation in Gentry and Halevi’s
lattice based scheme in Gentry and Halevi [56] takes from 2.5 seconds to 2.2 hours. And for
the evaluation step, a recent research by Gentry et al. [59] shows a homomorphic evaluation
of AES-128 requires 36 hours which is actually incredibly slow compared with the speed of
hundreds of MB/s for AES-128 on modern PC’s CPU. Very few applications can stand such
delays.
Another important limitation of FHE is with the memory usage. FHE generates very
large cipher text and uses public key sizes to guarantee adequate security to prevent against
possible lattice-based attacks. Gentry and Halevi’s FHE scheme [56] uses public key sizes
ranging from 17 MB to 2.25 GB.
Current research is aiming at improving performance of FHE either by focusing on new
fundamental math to reduce computation complexity or by implementing the existing FHE
algorithms on different hardware (GPU or nanotechnology). New algorithms are expected
to provide with an actual breakthrough in term of performance; however, on another hand,
hardware progression is relatively limited with regards to the need for a vast deployment of
FHE.
2.2.3 Performance study
In this section, we provide current research results about performance of the existing algo-
rithms and their implementations. We are adding our own implementation for comparison.
As we mentioned earlier, theoretical breakthrough of algorithm may bring a revolution in
term of acceptance of FHE, this may need many years of work. In the meantime, it is
interesting to search for possible optimized solutions including by using existing powerful
hardware to determine whether FHE is ever usable. Although many research articles have
claimed the performance of FHE are slow or far from application, it seems important to
characterize how slow FHE really is. Performance of the underlying crypto-primitives such
as modular reduction and large multiplication are required in many of the FHE schemes.
Actually, they are critical these operations could be significantly improved through the use of
GPGPU, FPGA, or ASIC technology.
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Table 2.1 Performance study of different based FHE and SWHE modified according to [40]
Designs Schemes Platforms Performance
CPU Implementations
AES [59] BGV-FHE 2.0 GHz Intel Xeon 5 min/AES block
AES [39] NTRU-FHE 2.9 GHz Intel Xeon 55 sec/AES block
Full FHE [136] NTRU-FHE 2.1 GHz Intel Xeon 275 sec/bootstrap
Full FHE (our test) BGV-FHE 3.0 GHz Intel I7 3-5 min/bootstrap
GPU Implementations
NTT mul/reduction [165] GH-FHE Nvidia C 250 0.765 ms
NTT mul [165] GH-FHE Nvidia GTX 690 0.583 ms
AES [38] NTRU-FHE Nvidia GTX 680 7 sec/AES block
NTT mul (our test) GH-FHE Nvidia GTX 780 0.81 ms
FPGA Implementations
NTT transform [166] GH-FHE Stratix V FPGA 0.125ms
NTT mod/enc [22] CMNT-FHE Xilinx Vitrex-7 FPGA 13 ms/enc
AES [40] NTRU-FHE Xilinx Virtex-7 FPGA 0.44 sec/block
ASIC Implementations
NTT mod [41] GH-FHE 90 nm TSMC 2.09 sec
Full FHE [42] GH-FHE 90 nm TSMC 3.1 sec/recrypt
The first GPU implementation of a FHE scheme was presented by Wang et al. [165] in
2012. The authors implemented the small parameter size version of Gentry and Halevi’s
lattice-based FHE scheme in Gentry and Halevi [56] on an NVIDIA C2050 GPU using the
FFT algorithm, achieving speed up factors of 7.68, 7.4 and 6.59 for encryption, decryption
and the recryption operations, respectively. The Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) was used to
target the bottleneck of this lattice-based scheme, namely the modular multiplication of very
large numbers.
An overview of FHE implementations on different platforms is shown in Table 1 in Doröz
et al. [40]. Clearly, since the platforms vary greatly according to available memory, clock
speed, area/price of the hardware a side-by-side comparison is not possible and therefore this
information is only meant to give an idea of what is achievable on various platforms.
Much of the development so far has focused on the Gentry-Halevi FHE Gentry and Halevi
[56], which intrinsically works with very large integers (million bit range). Therefore, a good
number of works focused on developing FFT/NTT (Number Theoretic Transform) based
large integer multipliers in Doröz et al. [41], Doröz et al. [42], Wang et al. [165]. Currently,
the only full-fledged (with bootstrapping) FHE hardware implementation is the one reported
by Doröz et al. [42], which also implements the Gentry-Halevi FHE. At this time, there is a
lack of hardware implementations of the more recently proposed FHE schemes, i.e. [34]
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and Coron et al. [35], BGV-style FHE schemes Gentry and Halevi [56] and Yagisawa [177]
and NTRU based FHE, e.g. López-Alt et al. [94] and Stehlé and Steinfeld [144].
2.2.4 Discussion
Results for different FHE algorithms and for limited evaluation functions (AES-128 bit here)
were presented in Table 2.1. We can use this table to conclude as in the European H2020
project [68] that FHE is still far from real application. But here, we can quantify the issue.
The AES block is processed in around 1-5 mins on an Intel Xeon CPU which is the type of
CPU currently used in workstations. A good GPU (Nvidia GTX 690) could help reducing
this processing to about 7 secs. However, considering the AES is processed at a hundreds
MB/s on PC’s CPU [37], which equals almost 1 million blocks processed per second, the
performance of FHE-AES is far too slow to get considered usable. Even if the hardware
upgrades, even if the performance of FHE-AES is improved one thousand times faster, it is
still too slow for general use.
Table 2.1 shows that we still need to progress by 2 or 3 order of magnitude before
deploying FHE. Our own code is on par with current publications for similar schemes and
similar platforms. The only hope would be to use partial homomorphic encryption (PHE)
or somewhat homomorphic encryption (SHE) but their usage will be very limited to niche
applications.
2.3 Traditional full encryption
Cryptography is the science of writing in secret code and is an ancient art; the first documented
use of cryptography in writing dates back to circa 1900 B.C. when an Egyptian scribe
used non-standard hieroglyphs in an inscription. Some experts argue that cryptography
appeared spontaneously sometime after writing was invented, with applications ranging
from diplomatic missives to war-time battle plans. It is no surprise, then, that new forms of
cryptography came soon after the widespread development of computer communications.
In data and telecommunications, cryptography is necessary when communicating over any
untrusted medium, which includes just about any network, particularly the Internet.
Within the context of any application-to-application communication, there are some
specific security requirements, including:
• Authentication: The process of proving one’s identity. (The primary forms of host-to-
host authentication on the Internet today are name-based or address, both of which are
notoriously weak.)
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• Confidentiality: Ensuring that no one can read the message except the intended
receiver.
• Integrity: Assuring the receiver that the received message has not been altered in any
way from the original.
• Non-repudiation: A mechanism to prove that the sender really sent this message.
Encryption is one of the principal means to guarantee privacy and confidentiality
of information. Traditional encryption algorithms in the recent several decades, which
is also widely used in information security in telecommunication fields, perform various
substitutions and transformations on the plaintext (original message before encryption) and
transforms it into ciphertext (scrambled messages after encryption). The goal of encryption
is to make the plain information unreadable, invisible or unintelligible to keep it secure from
any unauthorized attackers.
Encryption algorithms are traditionally split into two groups: Symmetric key encryption
(also called secret key) and Asymmetric key encryption (also called public key). Symmetric
key encryption is a form of cryptosystem in which encryption and decryption are performed
using the same key like DES, AES, 3DES, IDEA, etc. It is also known as conventional
encryption. The security of symmetric encryption algorithms relied on very large key space
and normally faster than asymmetric encryption on modern communication devices.
Asymmetric encryption is a form of cryptosystem in which encryption and decryption
are performed using different keys (like RSA) – one public key and one private key. It is also
known as public-key encryption. This two-key crypto system makes two parties possible to
securely communicate on a non-secure channel without the problem of sharing the single
key like in symmetric encryption systems. The most famous asymmetric key algorithm is
Rivest-Shamir Adelman (RSA by Rivest et al. [135]). The asymmetric encryption algorithms
are much slower than the symmetric ones because they use much more complex math
calculations rather than just bit-level operations.
2.4 Selective encryption
2.4.1 Basic concept of selective encryption
Selective encryption (SE) used for protecting data especially multimedia data has been
introduced more recently. The basic idea is to go as fast as possible to reduce the overhead
involved by securing data. Although traditional data encryption techniques such as Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES) [133] have become very popular, they have some clear limitations
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for multimedia applications. The main problem is that the majority of existing encryption
standards such as DES and AES have been developed for i.i.d. (independent and identically
distributed) data sources [32]; however, multimedia data are typically non i.i.d. which will
lead to poor speed of encryption pointed out in Fig. 2.2 by Grangetto et al. [64]. This
is because the statistics for image and video data are strongly correlated and have strong
spatial/temporal redundancy that makes them differ a lot from classical text data. And as
pointed by Lookabaugh in [92, 93], the relationship between plaintext statistics and ciphertext
security is already highlighted by Shannon in [141]: a secure encryption scheme should
remove all the redundancies in the plaintext; otherwise, the more redundant the souce code
is, the less secure the ciphtertext is [101]. Based on this viewpoint, the naïve full encryption
algorithms are not suitable for protecting the multimedia contents and SE methods are
designed to fit the need.
Fig. 2.2 One example in [64]: Original image (left) compared with AES-encrypted image
(right).
SE consists in applying encryption to a subset of the original content with or without
a preprocessing step like shown in Fig. 2.3. The main goal of selective encryption is to
reduce the amount of data to encrypt while achieving a required level of security. The general
approach is to separate the content into two fragments. The first fragment is the public
fragment, it is left unencrypted in most SE cases and made accessible to all users. The second
fragment is the private fragment which is encrypted. Only authorized users have access to
the protected private fragments. One important feature in selective encryption is to make the
private fragment as small as possible.
The main question for SE is how to select the private fragment to encrypt while keeping
the rest without an information leak. There is no general answer to this question because
as shown in related works, the SE methods are most used for soft encryption purposes that
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Fig. 2.3 Basic concept of selective encryption.
make them have different protection standards. For example, in some applications (video on
demand, database search, etc.), it could be important to encourage customers to pay for the
entire content. To this purpose, only a soft visual degradation is achieved, so that everyone
could still understand the content but have to pay to access the full-quality original content.
In some other use cases like sensitive data (e.g., military images/videos, etc.), hard visual
degradation could be desirable to completely disguise the visual content. And sometimes
only a part of the image is recognized and protected [161]. Moreover, according to Massoudi
et al. [101], many kinds of different methods are adapted to protect different multimedia
formats (JPEG, MPEG, etc.) or different multimedia contents respectively, however, state
of the art SE methods are designed to protect a given type and nature of data (e.g. bitmap
image, jpeg image, mpeg video, etc.). Consequently, they can protect only the kind of data
format which they were designed for.
In summary, different use cases and different formats of multimedia contents determine
and restraint different purposes of SE designs. The most important trade-off is to make the
private fragment as small as possible in order to reduce processing time while securing the
whole data content according to a specific requirements.
2.4.2 Related work of SE
SE methods have been described and discussed in many previous works (see an overview
by Massoudi et al. [101]). According to Massoudi et al. [101], SE methods can be classified
by when the encryption is performed with respect to compression (there are very few
multimedia formats that are uncompressed such as bitmap are not within this scope.). So
three classes of SE methods are listed: (1) Precompression, (2) Incompression and (3)
Postcompression. This classification is based on how most multimedia content is generated
from initial pixel information to packets transmitted on Internet (see Fig. 2.4).
According to Massoudi et al. [101], in the process shown in Fig. 2.4, the coding process is
always seen as the compression step as the widely used coding techniques especially entropy
coding schemes [83] can efficiently reduce the multimedia data size before transmission. So
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Fig. 2.4 The process of how most multimedia data is generated.
if the selective encryption is performed at the frequency coefficients step, the SE methods are
classified as precompression; if it is performed during the coding process, the SE methods
are classified as Incompression and the other methods that perform SE after coding step are
postcompression.
Precompression SE methods
This category of SE methods are mainly protecting data at its frequency space. In Fig. 2.4,
the transformation methods like Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) [4] and Discrete Wavelet
Transform (DWT) [21] are commonly used to generate frequency coefficients in the first
step. As from a viewpoint of energy distribution in frequency domain, low frequency areas
take less storage space while carrying most of the energy. Studies on the Human Visual
System (HVS) have confirmed that humans are more sensitive to lower frequencies than to
higher ones [123]. So the most important visual characteristics are to be found in the low
frequencies, while details exist in the higher frequencies. And these considerations have
had fundamental impacts on image or video compression techniques and also given the hint
about the design of SE methods. In fact, most SE methods exploit this energy concentration
in their designs.
The very initial SE method based on DCT is proposed by Tang [150] in 1996 to protect
some of the DCT coefficients in the I-frame of a MPEG video [82]. The author used DES in
CBC mode [33] to protect the DC coefficients and randomly permutated the AC coefficients
instead of the zigzag scans.
However permutation of the AC coefficients is not enough. As shown by Qiao et al.
[124] and Uehara and Safavi-Naini [156], with setting DC coefficient to a fixed value, a
chosen or known plaintext attack [8] can get a semantically good reconstruction. As long as
the DC coefficient in the DCT represents the average intensity of the corresponding DCT
block which is critical from an energy viewpoint, the rest AC coefficients still carries some
information that can help to reconstruct and get an acceptable visual result.
This situation is seen again in Puech and Rodrigues [123], although protecting only the
DC value can highly degrade the visual quality of image or even make an image totally
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unreadable, the DC coefficients can be recovered from the remaining coefficients which
makes the reconstruction of the image possible as pointed by Uehara et al. [157].
More recent works in Krikor et al. [80] and Yuen and Wong [179] protect not only the
DC values but also some AC values as well. These methods seems more promising as the
coefficients protected (DC coefficient and first 5 AC coefficients in Krikor et al. [80]) carry
more than 96% of the whole energy in an image use case. However, this is still not enough as
a protection method. Because in some cases there are sharp edges or many detail information
contained in an image that makes the rest high frequency coefficients could show some hints
about what the image is without any recovery of the protected coefficients. As shown in Qiu
and Memmi [126], the reconstructed image by padding random number for the protected DC
and first 5 AC coefficients is still able to be understood.
Indeed, protecting the low frequency coefficients of DCT can efficiently degrade the
visual quality which fits some use cases. However, degrading the visual quality does not
mean providing a good protection of the content. After all, as images are very different, it is
difficult to generally determine how many low frequency coefficients should be protected to
achieve a good level of protection.
Wavelet based SE methods are also shown in related works like in Chen and Zhao
[24], Taneja et al. [149] and Martin et al. [99]. The techniques include frequency selective
encryption, block shuffling, encryption of wavelet packet tree structures, etc. Although
there are no publications pointing that these techniques can be attacked, however, as pointed
by Massoudi et al. [101], these SE methods mainly aim to degrade the visual quality and it
necessarily is still difficult to evaluate its security level. That is to say, harder visual distortion
does not imply more security.
Incompression SE methods
In 2003, Pommer and Uhl [121] proposed a SE method that encrypts only the head informa-
tion of the wavelet packets which specifies the subband tree structure. This method can be
attacked by chosen plaintext attack as the statistical properties of the wavelet coefficients
remain unprotected which gives the possibility to reconstruct the approximation subband.
Protecting only head information is far from enough to secure the content, however, their use
case could justify this approach.
In 2001, [173] and [172] gives a new viewpoint that SE methods can be done during
the entropy coding stage. One method they proposed uses the multiple Huffman tables
(MHTs) to protect audio and visual contents by generating millions of different Huffman
tables using Huffman tree mutation [173, 172]. Indeed, decoding a Huffman coded stream
without any knowledge about the Huffman coding tables is very difficult as shown in Gillman
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et al. [61]. However, the basic MHT could still suffer from known and plaintext attacks as
shown in Zhou et al. [186].
The other method proposed by Wu and Kuo [173] and Wu and Kuo [172] is to protect
during the process of QM arithmetic encoding [85] (an enhancement of the Q coder [119]).
As long as the QM coder is based on an initial state index as an entry, 4 published initial
state indices is picked and used in a secret order according to the author. There are no known
attack to this method but it can only be used for the multimedia format with a QM coding
stage inside (e.g. JPEG standard [118]).
The similar technique shows up to protect JPEG2000 [151] images when MQ coder (an
enhancement of QM coder, see [151]) is used in JPEG2000 standard. In 2006, Grangetto
et al. [64] used a randomized MQ coder that randomly the two alternative coding intervals
that can achieve very good visual degradation. In 2014, Xiang et al. [176] gives another
protection method for JPEG2000 images by replacing the initial lookup table during the MQ
coding process. These methods can be efficiently used by embedding into the JPEG2000
coder and decoder but are also highly format reliance.
Postcompression SE methods
In 2000, Cheng and Li [26] proposed a SE method at the output of quadtree compressor [98].
The author takes the quadtree structure values as the private fragment to encrypt and leave
the rest leaf values unencrypted. However, as pointed by Massoudi et al. [101], the brute
force attack is practical for low information images and for high information images, the
encrypted fragment can reach about 50% of the original image size.
In 2008, Massoudi et al. [100] designed a SE method dedicated for JPEG2000 images
on packets level that can degrade the visual quality of images by protecting only a small part
of the original data. However, this method can be applied only on JPEG2000 format and the
performance could be weak when high level protection is required.
These kind of methods are also seen in Wu and Deng [174], Stutz and Uhl [147] and Engel
et al. [44]. These methods did protect the code blcok contribution to packets (CCPs) which
can achieve high level of visual degradation but may be weak against side channel attack.
2.4.3 Our SE approach
Massoudi et al. [101] classified SE methods related works in three categories by when the
encryption is done with regards to the compression process. However, SE designs are not
practical for an end user. As shown in Fig. 2.5, if we consider SE designs from an end user
point of view, the digital devices that a normal end user have are normally a digital device
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that will generate multimedia content (also including multimedia contents downloaded from
Internet) and a device that owns limited calculation capacity (a low-end laptop or a high-end
desktop, etc.). In this case, if the end user wants to store the multimedia data (photos or
videos) to a cloud server or to share these data through a cloud server, the data has to be
protected before going to the insecure channel. However, as long as today’s digital cameras
are not equipped with hardware or software available for any security calculation, the very
first data that an end user gets is the formatted package-level data like JPEG or MP4 files
directly generated from the camera (see Fig. 2.5).
Such a situation is not favorable to SE methods belonging to precompression or incom-
pression are efficient because the only way to use these methods would consist in decoding
the package-level data like JPEG on the laptop until transformation step (reverse the process
of Fig. 2.4) and applying the SE method to reformat everything again, which is of course
very time costly and complex. Moreover, even if this kind of scheme is used, the data is still
vulnerable as indicated in the previous section: many SE methods have not been published
with enough security analysis and are proven either exposed to attack or can be reconstructed
somehow leading to information loss.
Fig. 2.5 A use case that multimedia data should be protected before sending to could storage.
In our work, we reconsider SE in an end user scenario. On the one hand, nowadays, data
security is more important than a decade ago because we have security threats not only from
insecure channels as usual but also from possible information leak from cloud providers
(see PRISM [122]); on the other hand, however, the multimedia data have many kinds of
formats with very different designs which makes using format reliance SE methods difficult.
The use case we consider is based on an end user viewpoint that data of an end user should be
protected from not only the insecure channel but also the cloud service providers (the whole
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untrusted area in Fig. 2.5). Moreover, the SE design should be efficient enough compared
with the full encryption methods.
The general concept of our view is shown in Fig. 2.6. Three main steps are defined:
Preprocessing, Protection and Dispersion.
Fig. 2.6 SE conceptual design combines fragmentation with an example use case of efficient
dispersion .
In this scenario, data first goes to a preprocessing step that will perform the transformation
to help separating data into two fragments (sometimes more than two fragments) with
different levels of importance. This is the concept of fragmentation introduced by our work in
our SE design. In fact, fragmentation is not a new idea but a general concept used in computer
science in many different applications and usages (by operating system to optimize disk
space management, by database management or distributed systems to gain in performance
particularly in latency, by routing algorithms in communication to increase reliability and
support disaster recovery when combining replication and fragmentation together). Here the
usage of fragmentation is done by the transformation like DCT or DWT in our design.
The second step is the protection for different fragments. Indeed, data fragments of
different security levels should be protected with different encryption methods for efficient
purpose. The encryption method used in our design for the most important data fragment is
AES-128. Since 2001, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [36], is selected as a standard
specification for the encryption of electronic data by the U.S. National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST), it has become the most widely used symmetric encryption algorithm
in the world. Although many proposals of side-channel attacks for AES were published in
recent years (Piret and Quisquater [120], Ors et al. [113], Schramm et al. [140], Bertoni et al.
[13]), AES is still considered secure as long as no key abuse. Moreover, encryption algorithm
for the private fragment can be easily replaced by another one if need be. In Fig. 2.6, we
fragment data into two parts: private fragment and public fragment. The public fragment can
be as large as needed but carry as little information as possible. And the protection method
2.4 Selective encryption 25
for the public fragment should be light weighted or no protection at all with the target that no
recovery should be possible only from the public fragment.
Then the dispersion step should be performed to store different fragments into different
storage areas making for an additional hurdle for attackers. In Fig. 2.6, we design to store
the private fragment in a trusted area and the public fragment in a public and untrusted area.
This design fits the real scenario shown in Fig. 2.5 which can let most of the data stored in
public clouds without information leak and save storage space on the user’s local device. For
the transmission purpose, we have discussed in Chapter 5 that the private fragments can be
encrypted and transmitted through different channel which allows our design fits the needs
of both secure data storage and secure data transmission.
2.4.4 Performance issue of SE
Speed is a critical criterion and a key rationale for developing SE methods: encrypting a small
part of the data ought to be faster than doing it in full. However, the gain in performance is
not that obvious, as in some use cases, a complete SE approach adds a preprocessing step that
could lead to overall worse performance than full encryption. After all, the proprecessing
step also costs time and very few papers discuss and show performance of SE algorithms
implementation (Khashan et al. [77]).
Therefore, we should benchmark any new proposed method against existing ones–in
particular, the standard full encryption methods (today, AES)– using end to end comparison
and similar hardware. The need for regular benchmarking is reinforced by the fast paced
progression of hardware architecture and software implementations of full encryption meth-
ods, as a particular implementation could reach best in class performance on a well-adapted
platform [37]. Overall, when accounting for every step of the process, it is not so clear that
full encryption is slower than SE, especially for some methods with the intensive steps.
One point worth consideration is that some random position permutation methods (Li
et al. [88], Li and Lo [84], Zhang et al. [182]) and chaotic based cryptosystems (Liu and
Wang [90], Bhatnagar and Wu [14], Zhang et al. [183]) are used to encrypt entire or partial
image data. These approaches do not have the performance issues we mentioned before.
However, the security level of the random position permutation schemes is weak against the
known plaintext attack. Zhao et al. [185] proposed to recover the corresponding original
image. Moreover, the main constraint of chaos based encryption schemes is that the finite
accuracy of numerical calculations on modern computers can lead to an arbitrary change of
major chaos properties such as the external parameters or initial conditions. In summary,
although these methods have generally high performance, their security levels are not good
enough as pointed by Amigó et al. [6] and Kulkarni et al. [81].
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Here we give a simple example to compare one DCT algorithm implementation (imple-
mented based on [112]) and AES-128 bit (this simple example uses only two very common
AES modes: CBC and CFB modes implemented based on [37]) on two different PCs with
Intel CPUs. The result in Table 2.2 shows that DCT 8×8 is around 45% slower than AES-
128 bit. Moreover, AES has a counter mode (AES-CTR [154]) which can be implemented
in parallel on modern CPUs with multiple cores. The speed is normally three or four times
faster (according to number of cores) than CBC mode on CPUs.
In summary, this brief comparison indicates the SE method using DCT 8×8 like Krikor
et al. [80] has serious performance problems given that the preprocessing step (DCT 8×8)
alone is much slower than standard encryption algorithms such as AES.
Table 2.2 Benchmark of AES 128-bit and DCT 8×8 on current CPUs.
Computer CPU AES/CBC 128-bit AES/CFB 128-bit DCT 8×8
Intel I7-3630QM 374 MiB/s 362 MiB/s 203 MiB/s
Intel I7-4770K 494 MiB/s 480 MiB/s 267 MiB/s
In this work, we define a SE algorithm implementation as usable if this algorithm meets
both a suitable level of security with regard to the needs for the special use case and a level of
performance comparable or better than a full encryption algorithm (in this work, we use AES
128-bit as the standard encryption algorithm to compare). Based on this definition, many of
the SE algorithm implementation using DCT 8×8 in the literature are actually ‘unusable’ as
DCT 8×8 implementation is not faster than AES running on the same CPU.
This issue could be solved by introducing additional calculation resource available, such
as the common GPUs on today’s PCs.
Chapter 3
Hardware acceleration
In this chapter, the development of parallel computing especially General Purpose Graphic
Processing Unit is presented. Both the hardware and software development are given to
illustrate the huge improvement of GPGPU in the last decade. Then, the GPGPU of Nvidia
is chosen as the platform used for this thesis and the detail information is given.
3.1 Background of parallel computing
Moore’s law [139], in the form of doubling the number of transistors in a dense Integrated
Circuit (IC) every two years was proven to be met from the 60s to late 90s. In the meantime,
clock speed, which determines the main frequency of the chip and is a key criteria to measure
the commodity computer CPU’s performance, also doubled about every 18 months until
2000 [19]. In this period, Bixby [15] pointed that from 1987 to 2000, performance of
commercial Linear Programming solvers were increased one million times faster: 1000 times
coming from better methods and the other 1000 times benefited from general improvement
in performance in computers technology.
From the 1970s, when the first generation of CPU was created, to the year of 2004,
most of computer CPUs used a serial model of execution for calculation tasks. The main
improvements were more transistors, higher clock speed, and better memory technology.
Among these factors, the clock speed, linked to the IC technology, determines the minimal
time one CPU round needs, always increased at every new generation of computer CPUs
until 2004. As pointed by Brodtkorb et al. [19], the main frequency of computer CPUs seem
to reach some physical limit in early 2000s. It is also reported by Owens [114] that CPU
main frequency increased from 0.5 GHz in 1991 (HP PA-RISC) to 3.6 GHz in 2005 (Intel
Xeon). But nowadays, clock frequencies seem stabilized: on Intel CPUs we see even less
than 3.6 GHz (commonly between 2.0 GHz and 3.5 GHz without boost). At the same time,
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however, we see parallelism keeping growing in CPU architecture from two cores inside one
CPU to dozens of cores integrated within one CPU. From then on, parallel implementation
for calculation tasks became so important that solutions for complex algorithms need to be
optimized to fully exploit the multi-core architecture of modern CPUs.
Parallel computing is not a new idea. Since the 1960s, as the first computers with
multiple processors were built up and deployed, parallel computation became a wide spread
programming technique. Indeed, according to [19], there are different types of parallel
computing in different levels and formats: e.g. parallelism at IC instruction level is common
today [162]; parallelism for tasks and for data are the main optimization used by modern IC
designs. The task parallelism consists on processing a large number of input elements in to
a pipeline that feeds output of each successive task into the input of the next task. This is
commonly seen on a computer CPU’s working way that divides this pipeline by time and
calculate each pipeline stage in turn. However, data parallelism has a different approach that
divides the calculation of the pipeline by space instead of time. This model makes it possible
that different parts of hardware can be customized with dedicated-purpose for different task
calculation to achieve a generally greater computation efficiency over a general-purpose
solution.
The different parallel designs for computing are according to the application needs. In
this recent decade, huge number of applications for digital contents especially multimedia
contents show up with a different feature for the needs of computing. An important feature
of these applications need is that the data can be processed independently and in any order
on different processing elements for similar operations which is called throughput comput-
ing [91]. The throughput computing applications are also seen as the most important classes
of future applications [9, 76].
In such a situation, the traditional philosophies of designing CPUs which is to provide
calculation capacity for different applications and fast response time for a single task were
not suit for these application needs now. Moreover, due to the cost of technology complexity
and power consumptions, the main stream CPUs in recent years are integrating only a small
number of processing general-purpose cores on one die like Intel-I7 series CPUs [23].
At the same time when we see the parallelism keeps growing in CPU architecture,
Graphic Processing Unit (GPU), built on different initial philosophies, as an alternative
parallelism model, showed up to fit the needs of these application calculation. In the
beginning, designed as subordinate processors, GPUs are built specially for rendering and
other graphics applications for multimedia data. This category of applications determined
Single-Instruction-Multiple-Data (SIMD) as the basic execution model of GPU. This is
borrowed from vector computers [11] built in 1970s.
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In this recent decade, driven by the needs of multimedia applications especially gaming
industry and needs for accelerating some general-purpose applications that fits more data
parallelism, GPU was well developed with both hardware upgrades and software adaption
that gives rise to a wider General-Purpose-Graphic-Processing-Unit (GPGPU) field [115].
And until today, not only three of the world’s five fastest supercomputers use GPU acceler-
ation [72], but also almost every personal computer is equipped with a high performance
GPGPU to accelerate special applications.
3.2 Development of modern GPGPU
The initial role that the GPU play was just a normal component in common PCs. Nowadays,
high performance GPUs are common on not only on professional workstations, servers, or
super-computers but also personal computers with different capability. Initially, GPU cards
are dedicated to video memories and special calculation units. Today, the need for speed
of dedicated memories and calculation units are still the main requirement for the GPU
performance.
In this section, the development in hardware and software of GPUs for personal computers
is presented to elaborate on how GPUs become so efficient for calculation tasks. The Nvidia
GeForce series GPUs (for PC users) will be used as examples as we will be comparing
their evolution. However, the development of dedicated GPGPUs for workstations or super-
computers will also be briefly mentioned but they are not utilized for the use cases we discuss
and evaluate.
3.2.1 Hardware development
In this section, the hardware evolvement of modern PCs is introduced. As shown in Fig. 3.1,
the host memory (CPU memory) is controlled by CPU and communicates with GPU through
PCI Bus. And there is a specific memory (DRAM) for GPU.
In the last two decades, the hardware and industrial process for making GPUs have
improved so much that now owning a high performance GPU on a personal computer
is common. However, unlike the development of CPUs in the past 40 years, the most
performance gain of GPU does not come from the increase of main frequency but from the
increasing number of calculation cores and architecture of their dedicated memory.
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Fig. 3.1 Memory architecture of CPU and GPU on modern PCs [110].
Memory
GPU memory, also called as video RAM, is an independent memory card integrated on
GPU board communicating with the host memory on motherboard through bus. The GPU
memory we mentioned in this section is only about the memory on GPU board (called ’global
memory’ in Nvidia CUDA) not in GPU chip (caches, called ’shared memory’ or ’texture’,
etc in Nvidia CUDA).
The speed of GPU memory is measured by the memory bandwidth, which is basically
the speed of the read and write operations of the dedicated video memory by the calculation
cores. Normally, it’s measured in gigabytes per second (GB/s). The reason why there is an
independent memory for GPUs is that the GPU cores are calculating much faster than the
bus transfer speed and in recent decades, even the speed of the host memory cannot meet the
calculation needs. If the memory is not fast enough, GPU cores will wait for data transfer
after each operation and the memory can become a series bottleneck. As a result, since a
decade ago, dedicated memory became widely used in GPU with size ranging from 512 MB
to today’s 2-12 GB.
The memory bandwidth today is mainly determined by two factors: memory clock
and memory width. The memory clock means the clock rate of the memory chips and
memory width is the width of the interface bus. They are all determined by the standard
processing at each generation [10]: DDR (Double Data Rate), DDR2, DDR3/GDDR3,
DDR4/GDDR4, DDR5/GDDR5 and GDDR5X. If we consider Nvidia GPUs as examples,
in 2006, when DDR2 memory is still used for host memory by PCs, Nvidia GeForce 8800
Ultra has the DDR3 memory clock rates at more than 1000 MHz. Today, as DDR3 memory
is used commonly by CPU memory, Nvidia GPUs are equipped with GDDR5 or GDDR5X
that provides more than 5000 MHz clock rates [109]. Moreover, the DDR5 generation
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memory supports 256-bits or 384-bits for bus width which produces the theoretical maximum
bandwidth by multiplying memory width and memory clock.
Fig. 3.2 Increase of memory bandwidth (CUDA cores on Nvidia GeForce series GPUs since
2008).
The memory bandwidth of the best Nvidia GeForce series GPUs (high-end GPUs for
PCs) are shown in Fig. 3.2 in each year from 2008 to 2017 (data collected from Nvidia
website). The memory bandwidth increases about 10 times faster in the past 9 years from
about 50 GB/Sec to 484 GB/Sec. One point should be noticed is the GTX 780Ti is the
enhanced version of GTX 780 but with a difference that Ti means a very enhanced version.
The GTX 780 is one of the GPU card used in this thesis.
Calculation cores
Today, all GPU manufacturers including both AMD and NVIDIA are building architectures
with unified, massively parallel programmable units at their cores. However, as pointed
by Owens et al. [115], a decade ago, the GPU was just a fixed-function processor, building
around the graphics pipeline, it could excel at three-dimensional (3-D) graphics but little
else.
In fact, the initial design of GPUs was to treat computer graphics primitives such as
vertices and pixels inputting as a stream model. For one piece of data input, there is a vertex
processor calculating points (seen as multiple component vectors) and another processor
calculating pixel color and so on. Inside one GPU chip, many processing units with this
simple architecture are integrated and connected via data flows to perform this simple
operation and use the spatial parallelism of graphic applications (e.g. for one frame, which
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pixel is calculated first is not important). In 2003, the GPU ATI R300 had eight-pixel
pipelines handling single-instruction, multiple-computing processing [96].
Fig. 3.3 Increase of calculation cores (CUDA cores on Nvidia GeForce series GPUs since
2008).
This simplicity of GPU architecture made it possible to use large areas of chip real estate
for computation engines. In 2003, the ATI R300 chip has more than 110 million transistors
which is almost same as Intel’s Xeon microprocessor with 108 million in the same year.
However, more than 60% transistors of the Xeon are devoted to cache [96]. Nowadays, in
2016, the Intel CPU for PCs contains 1-2 billion transistors in die [71] and Nvidia GPU has
5.2 billion transistors on GTX 980 and 7.2 billion transistors on GTX 1080 [109] with a
much larger improvement than CPU’s progression compared with one decade ago.
Another direct comparison of hardware improvement is the number of CUDA cores in
Nvidia series GPUs in Fig. 3.3. The CUDA cores counted here is the special single-precision
calculation cores of Nvidia GPUs in GeForce series (designed for PCs, mainly for gaming
purpose) and more details of CUDA will be explained in following sections. From 2008 to
2017, the Nvidia GPUs produced in each year have evolved from less than 200 CUDA cores
to more than 3500 CUDA cores.
3.2.2 From GPU to GPGPU
Initially driven by specific needs for gaming applications, the computation capacity of GPUs
are mainly fixed-function. Since 2006, as pointed by Owens et al. [115], the GPU has
evolved into a powerful programmable processor and GPU evolution has been focusing on
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the programmable aspects of the GPU. This is due to the development of calculation capacity,
it became more and more biverse application utilizing GPUs as accelerators for computing
bound tasks in general-purpose computing.
In the early days of programming, graphics specific APIs such as OpenGL [171] or
DirectX [65] were be used to perform computations. And the shader programming [46] is
the most common method to execute user defined computation on GPU. For example, the
operation of adding two matrices on GPU is one in following steps: creating a window with
each pixel corresponding to one output element; rendering one quadrilateral to cover this
window; then the texture unit will render this quadrilateral with two textures as every color
value inside each texture means the value of the input matrices; finally the color value will be
added to get a new texture which can get the output result based on the output quadrilateral.
During this process, as long as there was no API for matrix addition, the operation had to be
written to fit the existing API. This can be a really cumbersome process when dealing with
more complex general-purpose operations like matrix multiplication or DCT transform like
in Fang et al. [47]. In fact, Fang et al. [47] achieve 50% more performance gain with shader
programming compared to CPU with SSE implementation which is not a huge improvement.
In 2003 parts of GPUs’ fixed-function pipeline became programmable with the release of
the NVIDIA GeForce 256 GPU and C for Graphics language [49] (see Fig. 3.4).
In 2006, GPUs started to support the unified Shader Model 4.0 on both vertex and
fragment shaders [16]. The instruction set specially started to support both 32-bit integers
and 32-bit floating-point numbers and the hardware allowed an arbitrary number of both
direct and indirect operations from global memory (texture) which makes the single-precision
calculation much easier to accelerate. Since then, the design of GPUs are increasingly
focusing on the programmable units in the graphics cores and instead of being seen as a a
fixed-function pipeline, GPUs started to be described as a programmable engine supported
by large number of high efficient fixed-function units.
In 2007, NVIDIA released the first general-purpose language for programming GPUs,
Compute Unified Device Architecture (CUDA [110]). Also, as shown in Fig. 3.4, two other al-
ternative tools to CUDA have emerged: OpenCL (successor of OpenGL) and DirectCompute
(successor of DirectX).
Since then, the GPGPU developing entered a new era that the designing of GPU hardware
are for different purpose computing with parallel model and platform gives programmers
direct access to the GPU’s virtual instruction set, parallel computational elements and
arbitrary memory operations. It is possible to implement and optimize complex computation
tasks at very low level on GPU and the recent researches show the performance gain compared
with CPU are increasing very fast [19]. In the following sections, CUDA platform and
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Fig. 3.4 Evolution of GPU programming languages. Initially: since 2007 general purpose
languages such as CUDA, DirectCompute, and OpenCL have appeared. [19]
corresponding Nvidia series GPUs are chosen to be elaborated on implementation and
architecture details.
3.3 CUDA platform
As indicated by [110], the Nvidia Compute Unified Device Architecture (CUDA) program-
ming model was created as an inexpensive (since it is present as a graphic card in every
computer), highly parallel hardware and software architecture available to a continuously
larger community of more and more various application developers.
The main purpose of this CUDA platform is to manage computations on the GPU as a
data-parallel computing task without mapping them to a graphics APIs. Also, not only the
software level is designed to give a new general-purpose C-like programming language, but
also the hardware is adapted to support multi-threads at a hardware level.
It is available for the Nvidia GeForce series GPUs (for PCs), Nvidia Quadro series
GPUs (for professional rendering), Nvidia Tesla series GPUs (for science especially math
calculation) and Nvidia Tegra GPUs (for mobile platforms). Although different Nvidia series
GPUs have the same CUDA architecture, the design purpose and hardware configurations
are very different. In this subsection ,we elaborate the three most important factors in CUDA
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paltform and explain the details for implementing calculation on CUDA-enabled GPUs.
More details of different GPU series will be mentioned later in this chapter.
3.3.1 CUDA cores
The most common way to measure a Nvidia GPU calculation capacity is counting the CUDA
cores. High-end PC GPUs today have more than 2000 CUDA cores. However, it is not fair
to compare GPU and CPU by them. Basically a core in a CPU means an independent core
with large cache that can handle each single operation a computer does including calculation,
memory fetching, I/O, interrupts with a highly complex instruction set. In CUDA, the
corresponding concept should be Multiprocessors (namely Streaming Multiprocessor, shortly
as SM) instead of CUDA cores as shown in Fig. 3.5.
Fig. 3.5 CUDA-enabled Nvidia GPGPU device architecture. [78]
As shown in Fig. 3.5, each SM (Multiprocessor in Figure) has its own instruction unit,
registers, different caches and from 8 to 128 CUDA cores based on different version of
architectures (also called stream processors, SP in previous version of Nvidia docs). This
SM can perform the complex functions that similar to what a CPU core can do. The actual
CUDA cores inside each SM are just weak calculation cores that can only perform simpler
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calculations but in a real hardware-level parallel (all CUDA threads are mapping to different
CUDA cores and executed in different hardware calculation unit in parallel). This is the
SIMD model that lets the CUDA cores within the same SM execute same instruction on
different pieces of data. Besides, CUDA cores on the same generation of GPUs are the same,
and different generations of CUDA cores are similar except different technology process and
power consumptions, etc.
3.3.2 CUDA threads model
Normally in a CPU scenario, thread, a component of a process, means the smallest sequence
of programmed instructions that is handled by the operating systems. Also, definition of
Multi-threads on a computer architecture normally corresponds to how many physical cores
the CPU has. For instance, systems with a single processor generally implement multi-threads
program by slicing the time which is to make the CPU switch between different software
threads. This switch between processes make the user cannot tell that the threads are not
physically parallelized. Modern CPUs equipped with several physical cores like Intel PC
CPUs can execute multiple threads in physical parallel with every processor or core executing
a separate thread simultaneously.
Threads used in GPU case have a different definition with the one used for CPUs. Based
on a totally different design method, the GPUs are designed mainly for calculation instead
of managing tasks or logic operations. So the usage of physical parallel threads is much
more important than the number in CPU case (normally more than tens of thousands). These
threads are more likely to be only simple calculation tasks. Not like the CPU threads, CUDA
threads have to be in a very regular fashion with no branches and inter-thread communication
to maintain the efficiency. For implementation, CUDA threads normally are patched into
warps and sent down to the pipeline together. As a result, the irregular and branch operations
are difficult for GPU threads.
For Nvidia GPUs, CUDA platform extends C language by allowing the programmer to
define C functions, called ’kernels’, that, when called, are executed N times in parallel by
N different CUDA threads, as opposed to only once like regular C functions. As shown in
Fig.3.6, the thread hierarchy architecture is that threads are grouped into blocks and blocks
are grouped into a grid. In the end, a kernel is executed as a grid of blocks of threads. The
key factors of the threads hierarchy architecture are:
• Each thread is executed by one core
• Each block is executed by one SM and does not migrate
• Several concurrent blocks can reside on one SM depending on the blocks’ memory
requirements and the SM’s memory resources
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• Each kernel is executed on one device
• Multiple kernels can execute on a device at one time
Fig. 3.6 CUDA threads model in layers built of grid and block [110].
Thread blocks are required to be executed independently which is to say they can be
executed in parallel or in series. This independence requirement allows thread blocks to be
scheduled in any order across any number of SMs which enables programming to adapt with
the number of cores. This feature provides adaptability to CUDA programs that allow to fit
different GPUs and to get efficiency even the configuration of these GPUs are different (e.g.
GPUs equipped with different numbers of CUDA cores or SMs).
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3.3.3 CUDA memory access management
The memory bandwidth increase shown in Fig. 3.2 are the largest piece of memory on GPU
board also called as global memory which is also the largest and the slowest memory on
GPU board. Other types of memory are mainly many different kinds of caches and registers
inside the GPU chip as shown in Fig. 3.5.
There are many memory technologies both in software level and hardware level for the
computer to accelerate the memory operations. The most common way for hardware level is
the usage of faster memory and wider bus. As shown in Fig. 3.2, GPUs are always using the
state-of-the-art memory hardware which can provide the best memory bandwidth. On the
other hand, for the software level of design, the most common way to accelerate is to exploit
memory by not only using faster memory hardware integrated on chip but also optimizing
to avoid cache miss. However, although the CPU has multiple levels of cache with high
performance, the operations with these caches are managed only by the operating system
and are not accessible to programmer.
Unlike CPUs, CUDA-enabled GPUs allows user to access different kinds of memory
during execution. As shown in Fig. 3.5, each thread corresponding to a ’Processor’ has a
private local memory which is the registers; each thread block corresponding to a SM has
shared memory visible to all threads of this block and with the same lifetime as this block;
and all threads can access to the global memory. There are also two additional read-only
memory spaces accessible by all threads: the constant and texture memory spaces. These
two kinds of memory are designed for some specific data formats. The constant memory
is used to stored the constants which can reduce the required memory bandwidth. Because
the constant memory space is cached, a read from constant memory costs one memory read
from device memory only on a cache miss; otherwise, it just costs one read from the constant
cache. For the threads, reading from constant memory is as fast as reading from registers
as the constant memory is cached on chip. The other special memory, texture memory, is
designed for threads likely to read from an address “near” the address that nearby threads
read. Normally it is used when the program ought to read the data often but update the
data rarely and the reading access fits the pattern of spatial locality. For example, in matrix
multiplication, the nearby threads access nearby locations of memory (neighbour matrix
elements) which can profit the texture memory. Moreover, texture memory can provide
additional speedups if we utilize some of the conversions that texture samplers can perform
automatically, such as unpacking packed data into separate variables or converting 8-bit and
16-bit integers to normalized floating-point numbers.
In summary, the core design of GPU memory access management is to not only provide
fast memory hardware as in Fig. 3.5 but also optimize the software level to let the user have
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the access to different elements of a complex memory hardware architecture. This could
accelerate calculation tasks quite noticeably. However it makes virtualization like in cloud
computing difficult for GPUs.
3.4 Different hardware platforms
Different GPU hardware architecture may have huge difference in all aspects. As limited by
factors like cost design purpose, or power supply, GPU configurations can be categorized as
low-end PC GPUs (for laptops or some low-end desktop), high-end PC GPUs (normally for
high-end desktops, but also on some gaming laptops, professional GPUs (for professional
math calculations) and mobile GPUs (with totally different designs). In this section, several
main GPU platforms will be mentioned and compared. Also, details of the two very different
GPU platforms used in our evaluation will be given.
3.4.1 PC GPU platform
In this subsection, a brief overview of the GPU hardware specifications is given by introducing
PC GPUs including low-end laptop GPUs, high-end desktop GPUs, state-of-the-art PC GPUs.
The main terms that determines a GPU’s performance is the number of CUDA cores, memory
configuration, and hardware version (also named "compute capacity version" in Nvidia
official documents).
We can notice that in 2011, the calculation speed of GPU varied a lot (can up to more
than 50 times faster) according to different GPU types because of their different hardware
configuration. This huge difference is rarely seen between PC CPUs. According to Gregg
and Hazelwood [66], the Geforce GTX 480 card runs sort algorithm more than 10 times
faster than 330M card. The reason for this situation is because of different design purposes
and limit of cooling system or power supply in different PC computers. In recent years, the
gap between high-end and low-end GPUs increased even more rapidly.
We categorize PC GPUs into three main categories according to which type of computer
they equip: laptop GPUs, desktop GPUs and cutting edge ones. Professional gaming laptops
equipped with very powerful GPUs and low configured desktops equipped less powerful
GPUs should be considered.
However, this category fits most of the use cases that high-end GPUs are more widely
used on desktop for gaming experience and low-end GPUs are normally designed for laptop
to reduce power consumption and physical space usage. The most advanced ones in recent
two years are listed as well to compare the main hardware configuration.
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In Table 3.1, we compare six Nvidia GPUs along three product lines. The performance
of Nvs 330M GPU and GeForce gtx 480 GPU (manufactured ain the same year 2010)
used in Gregg and Hazelwood [66] have very different CUDA cores inside which leads
to different performance for the same algorithm. The next laptop GPU (Nvs 5200M) and
desktop GPU (GeForce gtx 780) released in 2012-2013 both increased in all aspects including
CUDA cores and memory space. However, the huge difference between laptop GPU and
desktop GPU still exists due to the initial design purpose. By the year of 2016-2017,
the newest generation of Nvidia GPUs are using the newer generation technology in the
micro-architecture manufacturing. As pointed out in [109], the GeFroce gtx 1080 GPU
combines benefits of the new Pascal architecture and implementation which is 16 nm FinFET
manufacturing process, and the latest GDDR5X memory technology. These benefits allows it
to be 3 times more efficient than the GeForce gtx 780 with the similar CUDA core numbers
and even less memory width.
Table 3.1 Main characteristics of a laptop GPU and a desktop GPU.
Nvidia card Year
Hardware
version
CUDA
cores
Memory
(MB)
Clock
(MHz)
Memory
Width
Laptop
Nvs 330M 2010 1.2 48 256 1265 128 bit
Nvs 5200M 2012 2.1 96 1024 1344 64 bit
Desktop
GeForce gtx 480 2010 2.0 480 1024 1401 320 bit
GeForce gtx 780 2013 3.5 2304 3072 941 384 bit
Most GeForce gtx 1080 2016 6.1 2560 10k 1733 256 bit
advanced GeForce gtx 1080Ti 2017 6.1 3584 11k 1582 352 bit
The Nvs 5200M and GeForce gtx 780 are the GPUs used to implement our design in
this thesis. In fact, the two different GPUs are used to present the results for two different
use cases: a laptop with a limited calculation power GPU and a desktop with a much more
powerful GPU.
In the Chapters 4 and 5, benchmark evaluation for different calculation tasks on two
different GPU platforms shows that implementation details can be varied a lot due to the
different performance of GPUs. As long as CPU are also involved in calculation, it is
important to consider at least two very different GPU platforms since the difference in
performance of the GPU may modify the level of involvement of the CPU.
3.4.2 Mobile GPU platform
During the past decade, mobile phones especially smart phones have changed from just
handling dull text-based menu systems to a device equipped with powerful calculation cores
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and being able to render high-quality graphics at high frame rates. In recent years, due to the
development of the battery technology and circuit design, the CPU and GPU in today’s smart
phones have more capabilities than just being used for rendering graphics.
According to Akenine-Moller and Strom [5], a mobile device (mobile phone) is by
definition powered with batteries and also has to be small in size in order to be portable. As a
result, most limitations stem from constraints of battery-driven and small size. To provide
long use-time on the battery, the system of the mobile phones are designed to save energy
which limits the calculation power.
For the CPU case, the main difference between the mobile phone and personal computer
is that the mobile phone CPU normally has limited CPU instruction set and a lower clock
frequency (e.g., sometimes the division instruction is missing and often floating-point support
is not available). Moreover, due to lack of fans or other cooling devices,even if batteries
would suddenly become much more powerful, CPU calculation power could not be increased
rapidly just like in PC scenarios.
For the memory design, the memory architecture is quite different from that of PC
systems as in Fig. 3.7. A flash memory often plays the role of ’hard disk’ which can keep the
data even when the power is off. And there is a small system RAM that is located off chip.
As the feature of flash memory is the reading operation is faster than writing, some data that
are often used like videos or photos are stored in flash and loaded into RAM when needed. In
many cases, there is no dedicated graphics memory and no separate bus for graphics-related
memory designs.
Fig. 3.7 One example for mobile phone CPU and GPU system shown in [5].
In summary, because of all the factors listed above, the mobile phone GPU today cannot
be such power calculation chip as for PC GPGPUs. However, there is still a large development
both for hardware and software level. For instance, as pointed by Akenine-Moller and Strom
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[5], in 2008, the L2 cache shown in Fig. 3.7 is still seldom seen. However, today, the A8
processor used by iPhone 6 has a per-core L1 cache of 64 KB for data and 64 KB for
instructions, a L2 cache of 1 MB shared by both CPU cores, and a 4 MB L3 cache that
services the entire chip [7].
More importantly, in recent years, many researchers have already been exploiting to make
the dedicated graphics APIs on phone GPUs fit to general-purpose calculation. In [30] the
computational speed of the FAST corner detection algorithm is increased 24 times by using
GPU parallel computing on an iPhone 4. In [155], the Metal [138] and Swift based Deep
Learning library for Apple devices like iPhone or Apple TV is introduced and the authors
aim to make the iPhone GPU support using deep learning models trained with popular Deep
Learning frameworks.
Although the most popular tools used to develop the general-purpose computing task on
a mobile phone GPU are still graphics dedicated, it is possible to predict a general-purpose
platform like CUDA will emerge and the potential calculation resources of mobile phones
will be exploited.
3.5 Discussion
Over the last several decades, parallel computing has evolved significantly both on software
aspects and hardware aspects. The computation process has moved from dedicated algorithm
on costly equipped super computers to general programming model on almost every personal
computers and even many smart phones. Today, the field of parallel computing is having one
of its best moments in history of computing and its importance will only grow as long as
computer architectures keep evolving to a higher number of processors.
And as shown in our comparison of the Nvidia series GPGPUs released recently, the
Nvidia GPGPUs have multiple branches of products with very different hardware configura-
tions which will lead to different software designs. On the other hand, the rapid development
pace in hardware manufacturing will continually influence the algorithms implementation.
It seems like almost all problems of calculation could be accelerated by the usage of
GPGPU. However, there are still some reasons that limits the GPGPU usage. One of the
most common problems is the bottleneck of memory transfer between the host memory and
GPGPU’s memory. As pointed out by Gregg and Hazelwood [66], due to the reason that the
memory transfer speed is not so fast as the calculation speed, the GPU could be idle while
the PCI bus are busy which leads to the decrease of whole performance. This fact rises two
open challenges which are how to update the hardware to accelerate the memory transfer and
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how to design the algorithm to make the execution time of GPU overlap the memory transfer
time.

Chapter 4
DCT based selective encryption for
bitmaps
In this chapter, the improved selective encryption methods are shown based on DCT and
GPGPU acceleration. There are two levels of design with different purpose. First, the DCT
related bitmap protection is introduced. It is pointed that high frequency coefficients of
DCT could be used to recover some of the contents. Then, the performance issue mentioned
in chapter 2 is solved by employing GPGPU as a hardware accelerator. The two levels
of our improved designs are followed with many details to guarantee the minor loss of
image quality. Then, the security analysis is presented. At last, the calculation allocation
for accelerating process speed is presented to make the designs fit into two typical different
hardware platforms.
4.1 DCT transformation and selective image protection
The Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) is a Fourier-like transform, which was first proposed
by Ahmed et al. [4]. The purpose of DCT is to perform decorrelation of the input signal
and to present the output in the frequency domain just like other transformation algorithms.
Compared with Fourier Transform, which represents a signal as a combination of sines and
cosines, DCT performs only the cosine-series expansion.
DCT is widely used in many selective encryption algorithms ( Shi et al. [143], Chiaraluce
et al. [28], Yen and Guo [178], Tang [150], Tosun and Feng [153], Qiao et al. [124], Shi
and Bhargava [142], Zeng and Lei [180], Wang et al. [164], Wu and Kuo [173], Wu and
Kuo [172], Kankanhalli and Guan [74]). The reason that DCT is used in many SE methods
is because DCT itself is widely used in multimedia content compression algorithms. And
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DCT only has the cosines coefficients which makes it map real numbers to real numbers.
Compared with DCT, the FFT algorithm always has complex numbers that is difficult to store
and process. The second reason is that DCT is known for its property of very high ’energy
compaction’, meaning that the transformed low frequency coefficients are very large and
high frequency coefficients are relatively very small. As a result, this transformed results can
be easily compressed by using quantization to keep only a few low frequency components
(see JPEG standard [163]).
DCT has different types shown in Kresch and Merhav [79]. The most popular DCT
algorithm is two-dimensional symmetric variation of the transform that operates on 8×8
blocks (DCT 8× 8) and its inverse (iDCT 8× 8). This DCT 8× 8 is utilized in JPEG
compression routines [163] and has become an important standard in image and video
transformation algorithms and many other areas. The two-dimensional input signal is
divided into the set of non-overlapping 8× 8 blocks and calculation for one DCT 8× 8
two-dimensional block is defined as follows:
C(u,v) = α(u)α(v)
7
∑
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7
∑
y=0
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(4.1)
The inverse of two-dimensional DCT 8×8 is defined as:
f (x,y) =
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where
α(u) =

√
1
8 , u = 0
1
2 , u ̸= 0
(4.3)
As can be seen from equation 4.1, especially, in the forward DCT 8×8, the substitution
of u,v = 0 yields:
C(0,0) = α(0)α(0)
7
∑
0
7
∑
0
f (x,y) (4.4)
which is eight times of the mean of 8× 8 sample. In fact, this value is called the DC
coefficient of the transform results and the others are called the AC coefficients which
are independent of the average value. Normally in the image compression case, the DC
coefficient is relatively large in magnitude while the AC terms become lower in magnitude
as they move farther from the DC coefficient. This means that by performing the DCT 8×8
on the input raw image, the representation of the image (the main elements carried by an
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image) is concentrated in the upper left coefficients of each of the output 8×8 matrix (i.e.
low frequency area), while the lower right coefficients of the output matrix contains less
important information like details (high frequency area).
From the energy viewpoint, the DC coefficient takes most of the signal energy of the
input matrix. In most DCT-based compression algorithms like JPEG standard, there is a
quantization step (see Fig. 2.4) to rounding mainly the high frequency coefficients. However,
for protecting the bitmap image, compression is not an option.
As pointed out in Chapter 2.4, protecting only the DC coefficient of each 8×8 block for
an input bitmap image is far from enough to guarantee security. Other researches explored in
protecting some of the important AC coefficient as well [80], as long as in most image use
case, the DC coefficient and first 5 AC coefficients take more than 96% of the signal energy.
If the DC and first 5 AC coefficients (chosen as [80] but this is a changable parameter) and
padded with zeros and iDCT with the rest 58 AC coefficients, the visual content that can be
seen is really limited as shown in Fig. 4.1(d-f). In fact, selecting more AC coefficients could
help the visual degradation but does not help providing security.
Fig. 4.1 Theoretical protection results in [80, 125]: original images (a-c) and images that the
low frequency area is padded with zeros (d-f).
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However, SE methods like [80] (protecting the first 6 coefficients of each 8×8 sub-matrix
of a bitmap’s DCT 8× 8 results) is still not enough if the purpose is to protect the whole
image content rather than to only disguise the image visual quality. As the remaining 58 AC
coefficients carries very little energy, the iDCT 8×8 result for these 58 coefficients seems
almost clean. However, in some cases when the bitmap has many sharp edges, just padding
zeros to the first 6 coefficients can show some critical contour to help attackers guess the
original content by just visual like shown in Fig.4.1 (d-f).
Moreover, there are possibilities to guess the protected DC values from the know high
frequency values in each of the blocks. In fact, in the JPEG standard, original image data
will subtract 128 from each pixel intensity in each block to form the range [-128, +127]. And
in some SE methods this subtract is not performed. We calculate means of absolute values
of the rest 58 AC coefficients for each 8×8 block and renormalize them to a interval [0, 1].
The guessing DC value is given by multiplying these renormalized means and 2048 (upper
limit of DC coefficients if no subtraction) or 1024 if there is subtract.
Fig. 4.2 Three examples to recover original images by guessing DC coefficient.
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Fig. 4.2 (d-f) and (g-i) give the recovery results for no subtract and with subtract
respectively which can clearly show the original image contents. This is because a smaller
range and more accurate of the DC coefficient of a block can be estimated from the remaining
58 AC coefficients of the same block. Moreover, as pointed by Li et al. [87], recovering an
arbitrary set of missing DCT coefficients (except for the case when all DCT coefficients are
missing) at an acceptable level is possible.
In summary, although all DCT coefficients of one block can be seen as separate layers
with different importance according to energy distribution, SE methods based on protecting
only few low frequency area can just fit the use cases of disguising the image quality. When
protecting the image content is the purpose of SE design instead of degrading the visual
quality, protecting only the low frequency coefficients and leaving the rest coefficients as
plain is far from enough.
4.2 DCT acceleration on GPGPU
4.2.1 DCT implementation on CPU
A lot of effort has been put into optimizing DCT routines on existing hardware. Most of the
implementations of DCT 8×8 on computer CPUs are well-optimized, which includes the
transform separability utilization on high-level and fixed point arithmetic, cache-targeted
optimization on low-level [52].
However, very few papers discuss and show performance of SE methods based on DCT
8× 8 by giving implementation. It is important to benchmark DCT 8× 8 to watch over
performance as long as hardware evolves at a fast pace which makes DCT implementations
outperforming against a full encryption. E.g. the AES 128-bit can reach about 200 MB/s on
a PC’s CPU [37] in 2009 but the same code can run almost twice faster today. In this section,
we compare the DCT implementation on CPU and GPU today and elaborate on how DCT
8×8 is accelerated by GPU.
4.2.2 DCT implementation on GPU
GPU acceleration of DCT 8×8 has been possible since creation of shader languages long time
ago. However, it requires a specific setup to use common graphics API such as OpenGL [171]
or Direct3D [45] for general-purpose computing which is difficult to implement. Since
the appearance of CUDA [110], it is easy to have a transparent implementation of GPU
accelerated DCT 8× 8 on a recent Nvidia GPU with a natural extension of C language
programming.
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We should notice that most of the traditional low-level optimizations commonly used in
CPU implementations are unnecessary in GPU scenario. The floating point calculation is
native to GPU and the MUL, ADD and MAD operations on chip are executed with the same
speed. The optimization of DCT on GPU is mainly based upon two aspects: first to make the
calculation process fit the GPU calculation model; then to optimize the implementation at
hardware level (memory usage, data transfer, avoid bank conflict, replace multiplications by
reciprocals or arithmetic shifts, etc).
Accelerating DCT by CUDA is discussed in many previous works [112]. Normally, the
DCT 8×8 on two dimensions is actually a separable transform according to equation (4.1).
By definition, DCT is firstly applied to the columns of the input 8×8 block (on one direction
of the 2D block), and then DCT is calculated along the rows of results in last step (on the
other direction of the block). Each time the DCT on one direction is applied, it is actually a
matrix multiplication of the value matrix and cosine value matrix (or its transpose). This can
be seen as twice matrix multiplication as shown in the following equation:
DCT2D =C× Input×CT (4.5)
In this matrix multiplication implementation of DCT, the cosine value matrix (presented
as C) is never calculated on the fly but pre-calculated and stored as a 8×8 constant matrix.
The value of C is given in following equation
C =

0.35355 0.49039 0.46194 0.41573 0.35355 0.27779 0.19134 0.09755
0.35355 0.41573 0.19134 −0.09755 −0.35355 −0.49039 −0.46194 −0.27779
0.35355 0.27779 −0.19134 −0.49039 −0.35355 0.09755 0.46194 0.41573
0.35355 0.09755 −0.46194 −0.27779 0.35355 0.41573 −0.19134 −0.49039
0.35355 −0.09755 −0.46194 0.27779 0.35355 −0.41573 −0.19134 0.49039
0.35355 −0.27779 −0.19134 0.49039 −0.35355 −0.09755 0.46194 −0.41573
0.35355 −0.41573 0.19134 0.09755 −0.35355 0.49039 −0.46194 0.27779
0.35355 −0.49039 0.46194 −0.41573 0.35355 −0.27779 0.19134 −0.09755

(4.6)
As we mentioned in Chapter 3, GPU can accelerate calculations like matrix multipli-
cations. As shown in Patel et al. [117], the authors use this twice matrix multiplication
methods to accelerate DCT/iDCT 8×8 process on GPU and get a performance gain of 10 to
20.
However, as pointed by Obukhov and Kharlamov [112], the elements in matrix C still
contains many clear symmetric which can be used to accelerate the calculation again. Here,
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we use the DCT optimized algorithm from Nvidia technical report [112]. In Table 4.1, we
compare the acceleration for DCT 8×8 on two different computers, a laptop with an Nvidia
5200M GPU and an Intel I-7 3630QM 2.4GHz CPU and a desktop with an Nvidia GTX 780
GPU and an Intel I7-4770K 3.5GHz CPU.
From this evaluation, we first see that CPUs on a laptop and desktop computer are not that
different as performance of CPUs mainly account on factors like main frequency and caches.
For the same generation of Intel CPUs, performance are actually quite similar compared with
the vast difference of GPU performance of similar generation which mainly relies on the
number of the CUDA cores (which could vary from 100 to 2300). Secondly, as performance
gain for the laptop (low-end GPU use case) reaches a factor 10 which is similar to the gain
found in [117], the acceleration obtained for the desktop (high-end GPU use case) reaches a
factor over 70.
Table 4.1 DCT 8×8 accelerated by GPU for laptop and desktop GPUs.
Image size 1024×768 1600×1200 3240×2592 4800×4800
Laptop CPU time 3.78ms 9.24ms 39.4ms 108.4ms
Laptop GPU time 0.41ms 0.79ms 3.67ms 9.98ms
Performance gain 9.2 11.7 10.7 10.8
Desktop CPU time 2.88ms 7.0ms 29.9ms 82.4ms
Desktop GPU time 0.04ms 0.09ms 0.41ms 1.12ms
Performance gain 72 77.8 72.3 73.6
As we pointed out in Chapter 3, according to Gregg and Hazelwood [66], the calculation
ability of GPU varies a lot (can up to more than 50 times faster) in different GPU types
because of their different hardware configuration. Gregg and Hazelwood [66] show that the
Geforce GTX 480 card (high-end desktop GPU) runs sorting algorithm more than 10 times
faster than 330M card (low-end laptop GPU). We see the similar difference between our two
GPUs in Table 4.1. The huge difference of hardware configurations results in corresponding
huge difference of GPU performance. This is an important difference which explains why
a SE architecture dedicated to a laptop can benefit from using CPU and GPU while the
corresponding desktop solution will look at using only the GPU.
4.3 Design of SE for bitmaps based on DCT
As mentioned in Chapter 2, different SE methods are designed for different protecting
purpose and use cases. Here, in this section, we introduce two designs of SE based on DCT
8×8 for bitmap images: a first level of protection when speed is of the essence and disguise
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image visual quality fit with the use case requirements, and a more complex second level
of protection when a more global protection of the image is required. One the one hand,
our second level of design proves that by encrypting DC and a few AC coefficients while
still protecting the rest AC coefficients in DCT 8× 8 blocks can achieve a good level of
protection; on the other hand, our work shows that the data-parallel execution model of GPU
fits nicely with the preprocess step, DCT 8×8. This fitness will make GPU provide a critical
performance gain for selective encryption based on DCT 8× 8 since it is only through a
GPU implementation that SE is more efficient than a full encryption. Also we point the
allocation for arranging calculation tasks would change depending on hardware configuration
by providing evaluations on two typical different computers. The following results have been
published in [125] and [126]. We provide here additional test cases and a few more details
for instance or accuracy.
4.3.1 First level protection
In Chapter 2, we defined the fragmentation step to label the preprocessed data with different
levels of importance. Here, firstly, the input data will be preprocessed using DCT 8×8. Then
the results of the DCT 8×8 which are the frequency coefficients will be fragmented into
two parts according to the selection ratio with respect to the required visual disguise level.
The encryption system will be used for the private fragment (Fragment 1 in Fig. 4.3) and the
public one (Fragment 2 in Fig. 4.3) is let to be plain.
Fig. 4.3 General design method for first level protection where Fragment 2 is let to be plain.
Although the visual information cannot be totally protected and having the risk the
coefficients could be somewhat recovered, this method significantly reduces the need for
the data to be fully encrypted and improve the output performance. The fragmentation step
possesses selection ratio done in the frequency domain to increase or decrease the private
fragment to be encrypted allowing the user to increase or decrease the desired level of
protection. The selection ratio can be set by user, however, the coefficients [0,0], [0,1], [1,0],
[2,0], [1,1], [0,2] of the DCT 8×8 block cited from Krikor et al. [80] constitute the default
selection and is recommended from experience.
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This protection method will erase most important visual characters from an image (like
people’s face) as shown in Fig. 4.1 (d-f). It is recommended if for instance, the user’s target
is to protect against a mild level of attack from knowing who is in the image. More generally,
this first level of protection is good for soft encryption when high performance is required at
the same time. In the following sections we will elaborate how GPU is used to accelerate the
whole process and how to achieve the best performance on different hardware platforms.
4.3.2 Second level protection
As pointed out in Chapter 2.4 and elaborated in Section 4.1, Coefficients in high frequency
area of DCT 8× 8 sometimes can be used to reveal some information about the original
image especially some sharp edges or clear details are contained. For some use cases like
protecting whole image content without any information leak, a second level protection is
needed to protect ont only low frequency coefficients but also high frequency coefficients. In
order to guarantee that performance for the whole SE process will still be better than the full
encryption, a lightweight protection method is used to protect the high frequency coefficients
(see Fig. 4.4, generally, encryption for Part1 and light protection for Part2).
Fig. 4.4 General design method for second level protection where Fragment 2 is also pro-
tected.
A dispersion step is added to separate the storage of the two parts of protected data. This
fragmentation method is using Fragment 1 to build up a lightweight protection for the high
frequency coefficients (Fragment 2).
We go in more details in Fig. 4.5: the lightweight protection step uses the SHA-512
function [152] to get a unique fixed-length string (512-bit long) from the 6 selected coeffi-
cients (Fragment 1 in Fig. 4.4). The SHA-512 function has a feature that can generate two
totally different and unpredicted fixed length strings even if only one bit of the input string is
different. Moreover, according to [152], it is not possible to recover the input data if only the
output 512-bit string is known. This feature will guarantee that the 512-bit string cannot be
used to do prediction, recovery or guessing even adjacent 8×8 blocks of a bitmap image are
very similar. Because the block we processed is 8×8, the reverse DCT (iDCT in Fig. 4.5)
result of the rest DCT coefficients (DC position padded with 1024 and rest AC coefficients
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padded with zeros) contains 64 pixels. If we store these 64 pixels in 8-bit integers (Byte), the
total length is exactly 512 bits. Then the XOR step can protect every bit pixel by pixel within
each block.
Fig. 4.5 Design to enhance the protection level.
4.4 Storage space usage and numeric precision
There is a classic trade-off between the memory occupation (both footprint and storage space)
and numeric precision when it comes to handling floating point numbers. This problem
is rarely considered in traditional DCT based SE methods. The possible information loss
caused by not designing the numeric format transform between integers and floating-point
numbers seems to be ignored by many related works ( Krikor et al. [80] Pareek et al. [116]
Puech and Rodrigues [123] Guan et al. [67]). This is because most of the DCT based SE
methods are protecting contents with the compression step which is the quantization step
that rounded most of the high frequency coefficients, so no need of the design to store the
floating point numbers.
However, in bitmap protection cases, if we take [80] as an example, each pixel in bitmap
files is usually stored as an 8-bit integer (two more bytes are used for ‘Highcolor’ and two
additional bytes are used for ‘Truecolor’). During the forward DCT computation, these
integers are transformed into floating point (32 bits) numbers increasing the footprint by
a factor 4. At the end of the computation, numbers are turned back to integer and this is
repeated during the computation of iDCT. These value type changes involves truncation as
the range of encrypted coefficients are very different and some rounded values have to be
ignored in order to fit the storage space. This could lead to image distortion or information
loss when decrypting and rebuilding the original image. Moreover, recursive rounding error
cannot be avoided in this case if one bitmap image is encrypted and decrypted multiple times
by this scheme.
In our implementation, we firstly calculate the possible value range to determine how
to store the results. Then we measure the possible distortion or information loss in image
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processing by using PSNR (Peak Signal-to-Noise Ratio) [73] to show how much signal is
lost for different images. Moreover, more specific comparison between original images and
multiple encrypted and decrypted images are compared to show the possible information
loss.
4.4.1 Storage space design
For the bitmap case, we consider the gray scale image as an example (for 3 layer color
images, each color layer can use the same scheme for one gray scale image).
For each pixel of a gray scale bitmap, the input range is between 0 and 255. Since DC
coefficients are bounded by 1024 (subtract 128 from each pixel to reduce DC value range
from [-2048, +2048] to [-1024, +1024]), we used an 11-bit storage space to store only the
integer part (1 bit for sign and 10 bits for absolute value). For AC coefficient, it is easy to
calculate that the range is within -1023 to +1023 by using the definition and equations (4.5),
(4.6) (no matter the input range is from 0 to 255 or from -128 to 127). Our design is to use
11-bit storage space for each selected AC coefficients: first bit for the sign and the other 10
bits for the value (10-bit can store integers from 0 to 1023). For color images, the protection
is done for the different layers of pixels respectively. We call this design as 11-bit store
method and use it as default in this design.
After storing the selected important values, the remaining AC coefficients will need an
iDCT to re-transform to a 8×8 matrix with each element as an 8-bit integer. Here the initial
DC value is padded with 1024 and the 5 selected AC values are padded with zeros. The
reason why not just pad every selected element as zero is because as long as the DC values
and first 5 AC coefficients are zeros, the iDCT results will contain a lot of negative values or
positive values very near to zero. It is difficult to store all these values within 8-bit storage
space. However, if the DC value is set to be 1024, the average value is set to be 128 in the
iDCT result which is easier for keeping the coefficients. Then the value range is to be set as
between 0 and 255 to round all iDCT coefficients to 8-bit unsigned integers.
The extra storage space of 11-bit store method is just the extra bits used to store the
selected DC coefficient (11 bits) and the 5 AC coefficients (55 bits in total) which is 66 bits
more per 8×8 block. In summary, the total extra storage usage is 66/512 = 12.9% of the
original space usage. Considering the fragmentation step, the private fragment only takes
66 bits and the protected and public fragment takes the same storage space with the original
image. The visual results for the designs is shown in Fig. 4.6.
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Fig. 4.6 Visual effect of 11-bit store method (a-c): original images and (d-f): decrypted and
rebuilt images with PSNR values are 63.1, 62.7 and 62.9 respectively.
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4.4.2 Numeric precision analysis
In Fig. 4.6, we gives the example of visual results of the decrypted images (d-f) compared
with the original images (a-c). And the value of PSNR after encryption and decryption is
more than 62 dB as shown in Table 4.2. PSNRs of 50 dB for 8bpp (bit-per-pixel) images
usually results in almost identical images according to [73].
Table 4.2 PSNR for the selective encryption of different images.
Image size PSNR (enc and dec)
256×256 62.78 dB
512×512 63.10 dB
1024×768 62.76 dB
1600×1200 62.82 dB
3240×2592 62.85 dB
4800×4800 62.89 dB
In Table 4.2, we tested multiple bitmap images as input to show the PSNR of the images
before and after protection keeps about 62 dB which means the loss caused by rounding
in the design is really tiny. In fact, there are two places where the information details are
missing: first one is the rounding step of the DC coefficient and selected 5 AC coefficients;
second one is to store the remaining coefficients after rounding each of the iDCT results into
8-bit unsigned integers. second one is to store the remaining coefficients after rounding each
of the iDCT results into 8-bit unsigned integers.
In order to give a complete idea of the bit value loss due to the integer and float conversion,
a more straight forward way is used by comparing the different values in the gray pixel value.
Firstly, we take one image ’fofo’ (image (b) in Fig. 4.6) as the plain image. And each pixel
value of the reconstructed image is compared with the initial plain image. There are only
about 3% of the pixel values are different due to the integer and float conversion. Then we
select randomly one block to show the visual difference with this kind of minor pixel value
difference on visual effect. The following two blocks are the pixel values and only three
values are slightly different and are located at (3,1), (4,6) and (5,6). In Fig. 4.7, the minor
difference in visual is shown by comparing the original block with the reconstructed block.
The red small blocks in the right image are the ones different with original ones and all pixel
values corresponds to the following matrix.
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Fig. 4.7 Visual effect of one 8×8 block with only 3 pixel value different (original block and
reconstructed block).

128 107 94 86 100 99 99 117
128 115 98 101 87 89 102 95
127 119 115 95 94 100 104 101
134 125 110 121 97 97 101 98
111 117 107 102 92 96 114 94
107 102 114 111 100 100 111 105
98 109 102 115 102 97 114 104
91 88 112 101 101 102 102 95

,

128 107 94 86 100 99 99 117
128 115 98 101 87 89 102 95
(128) 119 115 95 94 100 104 101
134 125 110 121 97 (98) 101 98
111 117 107 102 92 (97) 114 94
107 102 114 111 100 100 111 105
98 109 102 115 102 97 114 104
91 88 112 101 101 102 102 95

As long as every time the protection and rebuild process would introduce the truncation
and rounding, recursive rounding error [70] is also introduced. In Fig.4.8, Fig.4.9, and
Fig.4.10, 15 rounds of protected and rebuild process for three bitmaps (images (a): fofo,
(b): barbara, and (c) lena in Fig.4.6) are done, and in each round, two results are compared
between the rebuilt image in current round with the original image: PSNR and the percentage
of changed pixel values. From the experimentation, the PSNR and percentage of changed
pixel values keep unchanged after several rounds which means the storage design avoids the
recursive rounding error after some rounds loss. In the end, PSNR is 60.919 for fofo case,
60.735 for barbara case, and 61.788 for lena case. And totally less than 5% (around 4.6%)
pixel values are slightly changed like in Fig.4.7.
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Fig. 4.8 Percentage of different pixel values (a) and PSNR (b) stop changing after several
rounds for fofo image.
Fig. 4.9 Percentage of different pixel values (a) and PSNR (b) stop changing after several
rounds for barbara image.
Fig. 4.10 Percentage of different pixel values (a) and PSNR (b) stop changing after several
rounds for lena image.
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4.5 Result analysis
In this section, probability density function (PDF) and correlation coefficient computation are
used to evaluate the protection quality. As pointed out before, our method will fragment the
image into two (a confidential fragment to be stored locally or in a high-level security place, a
public fragment to be stored in a public server). Also, the first level protection method is only
for disguising the image quality instead of protection, only the second level protection of our
designs will be analyzed here. And the analysis is only for the protected public fragment as
long as the private fragment is seen as secure by employing AES (It is easy to replace AES
to any other kind of encryption algorithms).
As pointed by Pareek et al. [116], it is known that many encryption algorithms have been
successfully analyzed by statistical analysis and several statistical attacks. In most cases,
visual degradation is used to evaluate the security property of SE methods for images. To
test the robustness of our encryption method, we will perform statistical analysis by giving
the PDF and the correlations for two adjacent pixels in the protected public part.
4.5.1 Probability Density Function analysis
A probability density function (PDF) of the image byte representation illustrates how pixels
in an image are distributed by graphing the number of pixels intensity level. For a gray scale
image case, Fig. 4.11 gives an example that the PDF of the protected and public fragment
of the image are fairly uniform and significantly different from the respective PDF of the
original image.
Fig. 4.11 Plain gray-scale image (a) and its PDF (b) compared with protected and public
fragment (c) and its PDF (d).
Respectively, Fig. 4.12 gives an example that for a truecolor image (RGB image) case,
the distribution for three color layers are all uniformly distributed after protection. This
property guarantees that the protected and public fragment of the image will not provide any
clue to employ any statistical attack [116].
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Fig. 4.12 Plain RGB image (a) and its PDF on RGB layers ((b),(c),(d) correspond to red,
green, blue layers) compared with protected and public fragment (e) and its PDF on RGB
layers ((f),(g),(h) correspond to red, green, blue layers).
4.5.2 Coefficients analysis
Lower correlation between original and encrypted data is an important factor that permits
to validate the independence between them. Having a correlation coefficient uniformly
distributed means that a high degree of randomness is obtained. According to Wang et al.
[167], to test the correlation between two adjacent pixels, the following procedures are
carried out. First, randomly select 10,000 pairs of two adjacent pixels in horizontal, vertical
and diagonal direction, then compute the correlation coefficient rxy of each pair using:
rxy =
cov(x,y)√
D(x)×D(y) (4.7)
where
E(x) =
1
N
×
N
∑
i=1
xi
D(x) =
1
N
×
N
∑
i=1
(xi−E(x))2
cov(x,y) =
1
N
×
N
∑
i=1
(xi−E(x))(yi−E(y))
x and y are values of the two adjacent pixels in the image for the gray scale image case.
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Then, the same operations are performed along the vertical and the diagonal directions.
As shown in Fig. 4.13, the correlation coefficient distributions of the cipher images seem
uniform compared with the original plain image. In Fig. 4.14, the analysis for the protection
results of a three layers of a RGB format bitmap image is given. In this format, every pixel
is stored using 24 bits with every 8 bits for one color layer. The protection will mix the
correlation coefficient distributions for each of the layer.
Fig. 4.13 Correlation of adjacent pixels in horizontal, vertical and diagonal direction for a
gray scale bitmap image.
4.6 Evaluations with different computer architecture
In this section, we mainly discuss the implementation of allocating calculation tasks to GPU
and CPU and evaluate their performance. As we pointed out in Chapter 3, the huge difference
between low-end GPU and high-end GPU makes the calculation and design for program very
different. Here a common low-end laptop GPU (Nvidia Nvs 5200M equipped with a CPU of
Intel I7-3630QM) is used to test allocation. Then using a high-end desktop gaming GPU
(Nvidia GTX 780 equipped with a CPU of Intel I7-4770K) leads to change and improve the
design.
One circumstance of the hardware worth pointing out is that the other devices equipping
by the two computers are similar (CPU, bus, motherboard, host memory, etc). Therefore the
difference in performance allows comparing with the GPUs and the respective designs.
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Fig. 4.14 Correlation of adjacent pixels in horizontal, vertical and diagonal direction for Red,
Green and Blue layers.
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4.6.1 Allocation of calculation tasks for a moderately powerful GPU
(laptop)
Fig. 4.15 shows the design steps to process a single bitmap image. The image content will
be copied into GPU memory and fragmented by GPU after DCT 8× 8 preprocess. Then
the selected coefficients which are considered as the private fragment will be transferred
to host memory and encrypted using AES 128-bit by CPU. In parallel, the remaining DCT
coefficients will be padded and transformed by iDCT 8×8 to build the public part. Then the
public fragment will be transferred to host memory for further dispersion.
Fig. 4.15 Process steps for first level protection.
This design is aiming at fully utilizing both the CPU and GPU resources on a laptop
by accelerating DCT processing using GPU. The total execution time depends on a race
between CPU and GPU. As we evaluate separately the execution times of on CPU and GPU:
the time spent by DCT on GPU is greater than the AES time spent by AES on CPU as shown
in Table 4.3. This is because although GPU is able to accelerate DCT, CPU just need to
encrypt a small part of the original data. The overlay and parallel design is very simple: it
uses the GPU to calculate DCT and then when GPU is calculated, the iDCT for the public
part, CPU is only calculating the AES for the private part.
This design based on laptop hardware configuration works well for a series of images
in the same format (bitmap) as input because of the overlay design of the GPU and CPU.
As GPU are calculating the DCT 8×8 and iDCT 8×8 of each input image and CPU are
encrypting the selected parts (data amount about 10% of the original image) in parallel. The
total run time depends on which processor is slower (on laptop use case, the GPU execution
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is always slower due to its limited calculation capacity). The working flow of operations is
shown in Fig. 4.16.
Table 4.3 DCT time on GPU and AES time on CPU of the laptop use case.
Image size 1024×768 1600×1200 3240×2592 4800×4800
DCT on laptop GPU 0.41 ms 0.79 ms 3.67 ms 9.98 ms
AES on laptop CPU 0.19 ms 0.47 ms 2.05 ms 5.87 ms
Fig. 4.16 Time overlay design of first level protection for multiple bitmap images as series
input.
In fact, as long as the encryption run time on CPU for Fragment 1 of I1 is less than total
time of period 2 and period 3 in Fig. 4.16, this design of overlay makes it adapted for the
second level protection method. The main difference is the hash function which becomes a
new calculation task. The initial plan for second level protection is to use the idle time space
of CPU to calculate the hash value of Fragment 1 of the image to be protected along the
scheme (Fig. 4.17). This is the right option as long as the laptop GPU is limited and cannot
calculate hash function fast enough. However, Table4.4 shows that the SHA-512 calculation
becomes the key element and our time overlay design in Fig. 4.16 will not suit anymore
as we would love to let GPU hold at time Period 2 to wait for the hash calculation. So the
overlay design in Fig. 4.16 should be modified.
It is important to evaluate time cost for all calculation tasks for second level protection in
laptop scenario. As shown in Table 4.4, the execution time of SHA-512 algorithm and AES
on CPU is still possible but it has to be covered by the execution time of DCT and iDCT on
GPU which makes a new overlay design still possible in the case of a series of images as
input.
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Fig. 4.17 Process steps for the second level protection.
Table 4.4 DCT time for one input image on GPU; AES and SHA-512 time for selected DCT
coefficients on CPU for the laptop use case.
Image size 1024×768 1600×1200 3240×2592 4800×4800
DCT on laptop GPU 0.41 ms 0.79 ms 3.67 ms 9.98 ms
AES on laptop CPU 0.19 ms 0.47 ms 2.05 ms 5.87 ms
SHA-512 on laptop CPU 0.29 ms 0.73 ms 2.8 ms 7.69 ms
If we consider the two same size bitmaps (e.g. two 512× 512 bitmap images) as the
input together, while the SHA function for the first image is calculated by the CPU (one hash
per block), the GPU will calculate the DCT for the second input image in parallel. For every
two DCT operation on GPU, the GPU turns to calculate the iDCT for the first image (XORed
with the hash results) while CPU continues the SHA calculation for the second input image.
And AES will be performed for the selected coefficients of two images together while iDCT
is performed for the second image. The time flow is shown in Fig. 4.18 to elaborate the
whole design. The ’Idle’ period in the CPU timeline can be considered as the redundancy
prepared for the possible delay caused by the memory transfer between host memory and
GPU memory (this memory transfer is always controlled by the CPU instructions).
The evaluation of performance is shown in Table 4.5. The execution time for one input
image is not exactly twice of the DCT time on GPU because the DCT and iDCT are not
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Fig. 4.18 Time overlay design for the second level protection.
exactly the same. The evaluation shows that the total run time is almost the half of the DCT
speed on GPU which is over 1.1GB/s (faster than full AES on CPU in [37]).
Table 4.5 Speed of full AES for the input image on CPU, our SE design, and AES for the
input image on GPU for laptop scenario.
Image size 1024×768 1600×1200 3240×2592 4800×4800
AES on laptop GPU 5.5 ms 13.5 ms 59.2 ms 162.3 ms
AES on laptop CPU 2.1 ms 5.0 ms 21.9 ms 60.2 ms
SE on laptop CPU + GPU 0.89 ms 1.94 ms 8.38 ms 20.91 ms
However, as shown by Li et al. [86] and Gervasi et al. [60], GPUs can also accelerate
AES computation. However, as shown in Table 4.1, GPU run times vary widely according to
their architecture. In Table 4.5, we compare the performance of full encryption using AES on
CPU and GPU with our SE method. Due to the limitation of the GPU compute capability on
laptop, the AES on GPU is even slower than on CPU. This means the design of calculation
task arrangement is highly based on the hardware configuration. And for a low-end GPU
laptop use case, using GPU and CPU in parallel for both first and second level SE methods is
the best implementation option.
4.6.2 Allocation of calculation tasks for a powerful GPU (desktop)
We saw in Chapter 3 that the evolving of the GPUs are so fast that the computation allocation
can vary over time according to GPU configurations. In our work, this fact makes it possible
to do all SE steps including DCT 8× 8 and AES on the GPU in some special situations.
The situation worth dealing with the situation on most desktops today where GPUs are so
powerful that can calculate DCT for all piece of data still faster than AES for only a small part
of data on CPU. This leads to a serious question: the overlay design of Fig. 4.16 and Fig. 4.18
are not working anymore. Evaluations in Table 4.6 shows that, on Nvidia GTX 780, the GPU
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time period for computing iDCT is so short that it cannot cover for the calculation of AES on
CPU.
Table 4.6 Run time in period 2 on desktop GPU and CPU.
Image size 1024×768 1600×1200 3240×2592 4800×4800
iDCT on desktop GPU 0.04 ms 0.09 ms 0.41 ms 1.12 ms
AES on desktop CPU 0.16 ms 0.38 ms 1.72 ms 4.67 ms
According to Li et al. [86], AES speed can reach more than 50 Gbps on an Nvidia GPU
of a desktop machine with CUDA implementation (In our work, it can reach almost 40 Gbps
on our desktop as shown in Table 4.7). In such a situation, the parallel design in Fig. 4.16
is definitely not suitable anymore as we are getting a scheme of GPU always idle and CPU
always fully used. Although the performance is still better than the full AES on CPU, the
hardware resource in GPU is not fully exploited.
In fact, according to these evaluations, we move all SE calculations including DCT and
AES to GPU for the first level of SE. This design uses GPU to work three steps in sequential
for each input image: DCT for original image, AES for selected coefficients and iDCT for
the rest coefficients. In Table 4.7, we list the evaluation for full encryption on CPU and GPU
compared with SE on GPU.
Table 4.7 Speed of AES on CPU and GPU, our SE (first level protection) on GPU.
Image size 1024×768 1600×1200 3240×2592 4800×4800
AES on desktop GPU 0.19 ms 0.46 ms 1.91 ms 5.46 ms
AES on desktop CPU 1.56 ms 3.8 ms 16.6 ms 45.5 ms
SE on desktop GPU 0.10 ms 0.21 ms 1.01 ms 2.76 ms
We can see that the SE we use is still faster than naïve AES on either CPU or even on
GPU. This results benefits from the idea that all the calculations of SE are moved to the
GPU. Based on these observations, we can see that using a GPU as an accelerator for our
SE algorithm is always a better choice compared with naïve AES. The main reason for
this situation is because although the AES can be accelerated a lot by GPU, the DCT 8×8
calculation itself suits better than AES to the GPU design. A deeper reason is that DCT
8×8 is optimized by many previous works that the calculation is adapted to fit Nvidia GPU
architecture; in the mean time, the design of AES algorithm utilized logic operations at the
bit level which is not as easy as DCT to optimize for GPU. This main difference makes AES
always slower than DCT on the same GPU platform. Moreover, the SE method of both the
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first and the second level protection generates only about 13% of original data to do the AES
operation which indeed does not add much burden for calculation.
For the strong level of protection method on desktop, the only difference is how to
allocate the hash calculation task. As pointed out in Chapter 3, according to tests based on
programs in Steube [145], the SHA-512 performance on the desktop GPU, Nvidia GeForce
GTX 780 is around 136 MH/s (means 136 million hash calculation per second). We should
notice that for each 8×8 block, there will be one hash calculation, so we can evaluate the
run time by SHA-512 as in Table 4.8.
Table 4.8 Speed estimation of SHA-512 of once per 8×8 block on desktop GPU.
Image size 1024×768 1600×1200 3240×2592 4800×4800
SHA-512 once per block 0.09 ms 0.22 ms 0.96 ms 2.65 ms
The speed is much faster than SHA-512 on CPU based implementation from [37]. Also,
SHA-512 implementation on CPU is too slow to fit the overlay design shown in Fig. 4.18 in
our desktop scenario. In the evaluation of second level protection, we allocate this hash task
to the GPU also. In the end, we compare the strong level of protection method on GPU with
AES on GPU in Table 4.9.
Table 4.9 Evaluation of AES on GPU, our SE (strong level of protection) on GPU.
Image size 1024×768 1600×1200 3240×2592 4800×4800
AES on desktop CPU 1.56 ms 3.8 ms 16.6 ms 45.5 ms
AES on desktop GPU 0.19 ms 0.46 ms 1.91 ms 5.46 ms
SE level 2 on GPU 0.19 ms 0.43 ms 1.97 ms 5.41 ms
Table 4.9 shows that the SE in second level protection mode on desktop GPU has the
same performance as AES-128 on GPU. In summary, the allocation of calculation of HASH
and AES tasks always depends on the computation capacity of the GPU while the DCT task
always can be allocated to the GPU.
4.7 Discussions
In this chapter, we implemented two levels of selective encryption methods both using DCT
8×8 preprocessing based on GPU acceleration. We defined a first level of protection which
is lightweight and is designed to disguise image quality. Then, we defined a strong second
level of protection that can provide a good level of security.
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The first level of protection design combines CPU and GPU resources available on most
PCs, tablets, or even smartphones today. It provides a very fast speed to perform selective
encryption in the frequency domain for bitmap images. The second level of protection
method addresses the issue with better protecting the public fragment which is left plain in
the first level of protection. The idea is to use a small number of high frequencies to rapidly
protect the low frequencies of the public fragment; indeed, the second level of protection
implementation also uses the acceleration offered by the GPGPU. Evaluations show that
it is about twice faster than AES on a laptop; as Table4.9 shows that SE performance are
comparable to AES with a high-end GPU as the ones equipped on a desktop. By two different
statistical analyses, it shows that the second level protection method offers a good level of
protection to resist recovery.
The separation of an image data into a private fragment and a public and protected
fragment can be used to address the issue with efficiently protecting large amount of bitmap
images using but not completely trusting remote storage servers like a cloud storage provider.
We separate the original data as putting the important private fragment to be stored locally
and putting the remaining fragment protected to a remote server. For instance, in a cloud
with the additional protection offered by the cloud provider. Doing so, we make the best
usage of the local memory where we store only about 13% of the data depending of a tunable
number of coefficients selected to constitute the private fragment. To perform one or the
other of the two methods, we refined the implementation architecture using both the GPU
and the CPU available on a PC and reach a level of performance that much faster than CPU
based AES and comparable with GPU based AES and never slower.
Indeed, one have to realize that GPGPU architectures as well as encryption algorithms are
progressing at a fast pace. For instance, late in 2014, a new generation Nvidia Geforce series
GPUs (http://www.nvidia.com/object/geforce_family.html) was released with more CUDA
cores, higher clock frequency and wider memory bandwidth, improving effective speed by
40% compared to GPU for desktop we used (manufactured in 2013). And this increase keeps
showing up in 2015 and 2016 with different generations of calculation core architecture
introduced, faster memory equipped. We are convinced that performance for computing
the DCT 8×8 and other algorithms benefiting from GPU like SHA-512 or even AES will
still progress. As pointed by Gregg and Hazelwood [66], the memory transfer between
host and GPU memory could be a bottleneck due to the limitation of the PCI Express bus
connecting them (normally several GB/s). During this work, we have seen that unfortunately,
this can influence the load to assign to the CPU vs. the GPU in order to obtain the best
performance. This would suggest developing a software adaptor to smartly allocate the
computation task according to the hardware architecture available. As pointed in Chapter 3,
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the mobile platform that lets CPU and GPU use the same memory which maybe a solution to
this problem. However, it is still difficult to see solutions for replacing PCIE bus showing up
in today’s PC manufactures.
Nonetheless, our work is clearly showing that selective encryption can potentially become
widely used for bitmap image protection since it provides excellent processing time, a
minimal visual content loss, a good level of protection by fragmenting bitmap into two
separate storage space, and a moderate increase of its total memory storage.

Chapter 5
DWT for general purpose protection
In this chapter, first we present the GPGPU based acceleration of DWT-2D. Then, the design
is given with both general architectures and details. The security analysis followed, for
different types of files, are presented to prove the good effect of our design. Then, the
benchmark section gives a general comparison of our experimentation on two different
computer platforms with other encryption algorithms. At last, we present the use case with
the transmission and secure sharing architecture.
5.1 Discrete wavelet transform and GPU acceleration
In previous sections, DCT (Discrete Cosine Transform) was used to support fragmentation
decision before performing encryption for bitmap image protection. However, DCT cannot
guarantee the total losslessness due to conversions between integers and floating point
numbers which will result in rounding errors (sometimes even recursively). These rounding
errors can be reduced by using more storage space with more detailed designs but cannot be
totally avoided. This is the reason why DCT cannot provide the integrity required for dealing
with any kind of data type.
Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT) [21] is sometimes used in selective encryption (see
previous work [63] [137] [121]), but most of the time it is used as a standard compression
step for formatting rather than as a preprocessing step for selecting in multimedia use cases.
In our design, DWT is used as a preprocessing step before fragmentation with a special filter
Le Gall 5/3 [21] which has an important lossless property by mapping integers to integers.
The DWT-2D based on Le Gall 5/3 filter fits best for our design for it can provide data
integrity and also be efficient both in performance and storage space usage.
Performance against full encryption is constantly required. The transform used in the
preprocessing step of SE can legitimately be removed from the benchmark when SE and
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compression are integrated and that transform is used by both applications. In these cases,
SE performs a light weight protection within the compression or coding process for a specific
format like MPEG4 [132] or JPEG2000 [31]. However, our use case aiming at dealing
with any kind of data will have to take into account the entire process when it comes to
performance evaluation since it should be able to deal with agnostic data type and even
formatted data. This will lead us to implement DWT on a GPGPU to benefit from its
acceleration [50].
5.1.1 DWT
DWT is a signal processing technique for extracting information mostly used in compression
standard such as JPEG2000 [31]. It can represent data by a set of coarse and detail values in
different scales. Naturally, it is a one-dimensional transform. But, it also can be used as a
two-dimensional transform as applied in the horizontal and vertical directions. For the image
case, this DWT-2D transform will generate four small images which each one is one quarter
size of the original image with one level transform: one with low resolution (LL), one with
high vertical resolution and low horizontal resolution (HL), one with low vertical resolution
and high horizontal resolution (LH), and one with all high resolution (HH). Then the second
level transform will only be performed for the first quarter (’LL’ part) of the first level’s result
which is called dyadic decomposition as shown in Fig. 5.1.
Fig. 5.1 Two level Discrete Wavelet Transform 2D result [31].
To perform the forward DWT, a one-dimensional sub-band is decomposed into a set
of low-pass samples and a set of high-pass samples. In our design, the “Le Gall 5/3 filter”
by Burrus et al. [21] is used so no data will be lost due to numerical rounding. And the
lifting-based filtering scheme [1] is used which updates odd sample values with a weighted
sum of even sample values, and updating even sample with a weighted sum of odd sample
values. The lifting-based filtering for the 5/3 analysis filter is achieved by using equations
(5.1) and (5.2):
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y(2n+1) = xext(2n+1)−⌊xext(2n)+ xext(2n+2)2 ⌋ (5.1)
y(2n) = xext(2n)−⌊y(2n−1)+ y(2n+1)+24 ⌋ (5.2)
where xext is the extended input signal, y is the output signal and ⌊a⌋ indicates the largest
integer not exceeding a.
DWT can be performed at different levels, we chose a two-level DWT as illustrated
in Fig. 5.1. In Fig. 5.4, the selected coefficients to build the private fragment are the 2nd
LL which takes about 1/16 of the storage space and carries the basic elements (coarse
information) of the original image. The reason for using two-level DWT is that the one-level
DWT still has a large low frequency part (1/4 of the whole DWT-2D result) to be protected.
Three or more DWT levels make the value range of the high frequency coefficients too large
to waste more storage space (more details about value range given later in this section).
5.1.2 DWT acceleration based on GPGPU
There are two main categories of DWT implementations on hardware: by convolution
operations [97] and by the lifting scheme [148]. In early GPU-based DWT implementations
(Hopf and Ertl [69], Garcia and Shen [53]), the convolution operations were preferred as the
early developing tools for GPU such as OpenGL or Cg. The performance gain compared with
CPU implementations was limited due to not only the limited GPU calculation capacity but
also the lack of a general purpose GPU development platform to fully exploit the GPU parallel
computing resources. In fact, the lifting scheme is more suitable for GPU computation as
each coefficients in this scheme is computed using the coefficient that in the even or odd
position and its two neighbours. As a consequence, all coefficients can be calculated without
dependencies therefore can be performed in parallel. This important feature is not fully used
until CUDA is released [78]. Not only it provided operation level parallelism, but it also gave
access to arbitrary memory operations. CUDA architecture along with the Nvidia GPGPUs
accelerates DWT 10 to 20 times faster than an optimized CPU implementation (multi-core
CPU based on OpenMP) in 2009 [50].
The reason why GPGPU brought such a huge performance acceleration is because unlike
modern CPUs with only a few powerful physical cores (4 or 8 on a Intel CPU for PC) that
allows only limited number of actually parallel threads, a GPGPU could contain hundreds
even thousands of threads at the same time. This can fit the scheme based feature to allow
each of the output coefficients calculated separately with a hardware level parallelism. The
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CUDA platform allows to realize the first generation of DWT-2D implementation by simply
using the parallel computing cores in CUDA enabled GPGPU since 2009.
More optimization came out after 2009 like optimizing the memory usage to avoid the
time consuming operations like matrix transpose. For example, the calculation rounds in
[50] are to load the data from global memory to shared memory and calculate the horizontal
direction of DWT; then the result matrices are loaded back to global memory and transposed
to become the input data for the next round. In the next round, the same calculation operations
are performed as the data are transposed so the vertical DWT can be easily done. This method
loads data between fast shared memory and slow global memory twice and transposes the
matrix once which is not efficient as pointed out by Enfedaque et al. [43].
Further improved methods [102] explored minimizing memory transfers between the
global memory and the shared memory by computing both the horizontal and the vertical
filtering in one step. The improvement is based on carefully arranging the input matrix into
rectangular blocks before computing and loading them to the shared memory by a thread
block. Then both the horizontal and the vertical DWT can be calculated in these blocks
which successfully avoided the matrix transpose or further memory transfers. However, there
is a drawback of such an approach: adjacent blocks have data dependencies that can only
be avoided by extending all blocks with some rows and columns that overlap with adjacent
blocks.
More recent research [158] shows better performance with more optimization in handling
the problem of data block dependencies by more memory transfer steps. And the result
shows that a 10 to 14 times speedup can be reached compared with a CPU implementation
using instruction level accelerations (MMX and SSE extensions). In 2015, the fastest
implementation of the DWT found in the literature is proposed by Enfedaque et al. [43]. In
this chapter, an optimized scheme is implemented with the state-of-the-art hardware (Nvidia
GTX Titan GPU). The DWT-2D with “Le Gall 5/3” filter for a 4096×4096 image can be
done in 0.467 ms.
In summary, as pointed out in Chapter 3, the development for CUDA enabled GPGPU is
highly dependent on both the software and the hardware architecture. In recent years, there
is continuing optimization for DWT as different CUDA versions and different GPGPU are
released.
In our implementation, the lifting scheme is used and the main method according to
van der Laan et al. [158]. As we are not focusing on the best optimization of implementing
DWT-2D on GPGPU, the performance evaluations are just based on the hardware we have
instead of the most powerful GPGPUs.
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5.2 Design of DWT based SE
5.2.1 Designs
In our design [127], as shown in Fig. 5.2, in order to deal with sizable input data it is
being proposed to cut it into several chunks of the same given size 2D matrix (e.g. seen as a
512×512 or 1024×1024 byte block which is chosen to accommodate further transformation
or the hardware platform architecture). Then every chunk (Di) goes to the SE process to
generate three fragments which are the private fragment DiA, the first public and protected
fragment DiB, and the second public and protected fragment DiC. Then the DiA fragments go
to the trusted area like a local machine under the user’s control and the DiB, DiC fragments
may be transmitted to the public area like a public cloud with little fear of an attack since
DiB, DiC are supposed to carry little information and also to be protected. This will be shown
later in Section 5.3 where a number of security analysis will be performed.
Fig. 5.2 SE General method for processing large amount of data.
The main idea is to consider every block Di as a matrix and be treated as such by the SE
process. That is to say any kind of data formats can be seen as a matrix by considering every
byte of data as a pixel to form a bitmap gray scale image. Then every "image" Di is simply
processed using the SE method block by block with block size 8×8 shown in Fig. 5.4. The
block size chosen can be changed according to the size of the original data. This tiling step is
used to achieve a nice fitting with the GPGPU architecture (will be mentioned later).
The first step for the 8×8 block is to do the Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT). In our
work we perform two successive levels of the DWT with the Le Gall 5/3 filter so the low
frequency coefficients which are considered as the private fragment (shown in Fig. 5.3). This
fragment takes only 4 out of 64 coefficients (with k = 4 in our implementation) but carries
most of the original frequency feature. The AES-128 bit [62] will be used (In our design,
however, the implementation is structured such that another encryption algorithm can easily
replace AES-128 if need be) to protect this fragment if further transmission is needed.
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Fig. 5.3 DWT-2D and fragmentation process for the single 8×8 block.
Then the private fragment of each 8×8 block will be used to generate a 256-bit sequence
by using SHA-256 [152] which can guarantee very different bit sequence generated even
when the corresponding coefficients of the private fragments in neighbor blocks are very
similar (encryption key is used to guarantee the key sensitivity in Fig. 5.4). This bit sequence
is used to protect the 1st public and protected fragment (the rest coefficients of 2nd level
DWT shown in Fig. 5.3) by performing an XOR operation. This fragment is defined as the
1st public and protected fragment as shown in Fig. 5.3. For the rest DWT coefficients which
forms the 2nd public and protected fragment, a bit sequence generated from SHA-512 [152]
results of 1st public and protected fragment and encryption key is used to do protection.
Fig. 5.4 SE process for the single 8×8 block.
The protection for the ’protected and public fragments’ provided by a XOR operation is
based on the randomness guaranteed by the HASH algorithms. For example, in bitmap case,
as long as there are redundancies, the L3 coefficients could be very similar especially between
neighbor blocks. However, the SHA-256 and SHA-512 will generate totally different bit
sequences even when there is only one different bit in inputs. This randomness will be
added by XORing the to the ’protected and public fragment’ which is the next level of DWT
coefficients and random hash value of the current fragment. For other kinds of files as input,
this design also has good effect. More security analysis for the protection will be shown later.
5.2 Design of DWT based SE 79
5.2.2 Evaluation of the storage necessary for DWT
Evaluation for the first level of DWT-2D transform
Input matrix is a 8× 8 matrix with all elements are 8-bit integers (consequently within a
range 0 to 255 or -128 to +128). As shown in Fig. 5.5, the Discrete Wavelet Transform
has two steps: first, in horizontal direction. This will generate all coefficients in all lines:
the first 4 are low frequency and last 4 are high frequency. It is easy to find out that the
range for high frequency is -255 to +255 (double the range of input). And the range for low
frequency is -192 to +192 (1.5 times of the input range). Then, the transform in vertical
direction transforms the 1stLL and 1stH blocks respectively. This step will generate four
blocks: 1stLL (low frequency of the 1stL block), 1stLH (high frequency of the 1stL block),
1stHL (low frequency of the 1stH block), 1stHH (high frequency of the 1stH block).
Fig. 5.5 Discrete Wavelet Transform 2D is calculated in two steps for the 1st level.
It is easy to calculate the range for the 1stHH is largest: −511 to +511 and the range for
1stLL is 1.5×1.5 = 2.25 times of the input range (−128 to +127).
In summary, the possible max or min values of the 1st level DWT-2D results can be stored
with 10-bit long integers (-512 to +512).
Evaluation for the second level of DWT-2D transform
The 2nd level transform only calculates the 1stLL block (shown in Fig.5.5) which is a 4×4
block. The calculation will also be performed in two directions. Finally, the transform
generates three 4×4 blocks and four 2×2 blocks (Fig. 5.1).
In order to calculate the possible max and min value in the 2nd level four blocks, we
need to get the equations for the coefficients presented by the input values. In order to get
the max and min values for the output, the input values are either -128 or +128 (reach the
max abstract values). So the rounding process can be ignored as we just want to estimate the
output values in this case. The equations (5.3) and (5.4) can be simplified as follows:
y(2n+1) = xext(2n+1)− xext(2n)+ xext(2n+2)2 (5.3)
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y(2n) = xext(2n)− xext(2n−1)+ xext(2n+1)4 (5.4)
In this case, the transform can be calculated by using the input matrix to multiply the
coefficients matrix. And for the 1st level DWT, the coefficients matrix A is:
0.75 −0.125 0 0 −0.5 0 0 0
0.5 0.25 0 0 1 0 0 0
−0.25 0.75 −0.125 0 −0.5 −0.5 0 0
0 0.25 0.25 0 0 1 0 0
0 −0.125 0.75 −0.125 0 −0.5 −0.5 0
0 0 0.25 0.25 0 0 1 0
0 0 −0.125 0.625 0 0 −0.5 −1
0 0 0 0.25 0 0 0 1

If we define the input matrix as IN, the first step of wavelet for the horizontal direction
can be presented as: Out put1 = IN ·A. Then the vertical direction is calculated: In fact, it
can be represented as Out put2 = Out put1T ·A (use the transpose of Out put1 to multiply
matrix A again) which will get the transpose of the result we want. Then the coefficients of
the 2nd level DWT can be calculated:
0.75 −0.125 −0.5 0
0.5 0.25 1 0
−0.25 0.75 −0.5 −1
0 0.125 0 1

It is the same to calculate the 2nd level DWT but only on the 1stLL block. If we define
the final output matrix as F , we list the F(4,4) as follows:
F(4,4) =0.015625× IN[2,2]−0.03125× IN[2,3]−0.109375× IN[2,4]+0.09375× IN[2,6]
+0.03125× IN[2,7]−0.03125× IN[3,2]+0.0625× IN[3,3]+0.21875× IN[3,4]
−0.1875× IN[3,6]−0.0625× IN[3,7]−0.109375× IN[4,2]+0.21875× IN[4,3]
+0.765625× IN[4,4]−0.65625× IN[4,6]−0.21875× IN[4,7]+0.09375× IN[6,2]
−0.1875× IN[6,3]−0.65625× IN[6,4]+0.5625× IN[6,6]+0.1875× IN[6,7]
+0.03125× IN[7,2]−0.0625× IN[7,3]−0.21875× IN[7,4]+0.1875× IN[7,6]
+0.0625× IN[7,7]
(5.5)
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It is easy to calculate the max and min values if input of IN is within −128 to +128. The
max value is 648 and min value is −648. Then we calculate all the max values for all 16
values of 2nd level DWT output and put them in the same matrix (min values are the same
absolute value but negative): 
338 267 468 468
267 211 369 369
468 369 648 648
468 369 648 648

According to this calculation, there are only four values that could possibly exceed the
range of (−512,+512). The storage method for the four values should be designed as 11-bit
long (−1024,+1024). Then the 2ndLL block (the private fragment) storage space is 40 bits.
The 2ndHL,2ndLH,2ndHH blocks (1st public and protected fragment) take 40+40+44 =
124 bits in total. The 1stLL,1stHL,1stLH,1stHH blocks (2nd public and protected fragment)
take 480 bits.
5.2.3 Storage space usage and numeric precision
Because of the transformation step used for the SE, the footprint of the data before and
after the transformation could be different. This would lead to the difference of the storage
space usage or rounding errors caused by conversions between integers and floating point
numbers. In Guan et al. [67], the authors claim all variables are declared as type double
with a bit-length of 64 bits. This is unnecessary in our case as the input data are stored
as integers especially int type with a bit-length of 8 bits as the storage of the results will
require 8 times more storage space compared with original data. In Qiu and Memmi [126]
we already designed how to optimize integer representation but still could not avoid possible
rounding errors caused by the calculation of DCT.
In this chapter, the preprocessing step is the DWT based on “Le Gall 5/3” filter which
is designed to be an invertible integer-to-integer map, such that the DWT Le Gall 5/3 is
lossless. As a result, on one hand, any rounding error is avoided; on the other hand, the extra
storage space usage caused by the int to f loat conversion does not exist. The only possible
extra storage usage could be caused by the different value range of the input 8-bit int and
the output int coefficients. And the output value range can be calculated as long as the input
values are always stored Byte by Byte, the input value range (seen as unsigned value) is
from 0 to 255 which can be considered as from −128 to +127 (the range is seen as from
−128 to +128 during the following calculation). Then the storage methods can be optimized
according to the value range distribution.
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The first level DWT-2D transform is actually calculated by twice DWT-1D transforms
(equation (1) and (2)) on the 8×8 block in horizontal and vertical directions sequentially.
The first horizontal transform generates two sub-matrices which are 1stL and 1stH that take
each half of the result matrix horizontally. The vertical transform is done on each of the two
sub-matrices which generates four sub-matrices like in Fig. 4 (1stLL,1stHL,1stLH,1stHH).
In the first horizontal transform, the range for 1stH is -255 to +255 (double the range of
input) and the range for the 1stL is -192 to +192 (1.5 times of the input range). Then the
transform in vertical direction, which is transform of the 1stL and 1stH blocks respectively,
gets the following results: 1stHH is from −511 to +511 and the range for 1stLH is from
−384 to +384. All the coefficients in the three sub-matrices of first level DWT-2D transform
can be stored using 10-bits storage space.
The value range of second level DWT-2D coefficients are generated by the same two
direction DWT-1D transform of the 1stLL sub-matrices coefficients. Range of the second
level DWT coefficients can be estimated by simplifying the equations (5.1) and (5.2) and then
directly get results from calculating final formula of each elements in the four sub-matrices
in Fig. 5.1 (2ndLL,2ndHL,2ndLH,2ndHH). The max and min values for each of the value
estimated are shown in the following matrices. And the storage method for the second
level DWT-2D coefficients is: 11-bit long for each of the lower left corner four coefficients
(2ndHH) and 10-bit long for rest of the coefficients.
338 267 468 468
267 211 369 369
468 369 648 648
468 369 648 648
 ,

−338 −267 −468 −468
−267 −211 −369 −369
−468 −369 −648 −648
−468 −369 −648 −648

As shown in Fig. 5.4, the private fragment we selected is the 2ndLL DWT coefficients
and all rest coefficients are fragmented into two public and protected fragments.
The storage design for the three fragments could be flexible. If the avalanche effect [169]
must be a concern (communication channel is unreliable and transmission error rate is high),
the private fragment and 1st public and protected fragment should be stored locally to avoid
avalanche effect. In such case, the storage space requirement locally for one block is 164-bits
storage in total (40-bits for private and 124 bits for 1st public and protected fragment) and
cloud storage usage is 480 bits (the 2nd protected and public fragment). However, if the
channel is reliable and error transmission are rarely to be seen, the 1st public and protected
fragment can also be put on clouds so the local storage is optimized which is important for a
smart phone use case. Anyway, the total storage space usage is 644-bits for one block (initial
512 bits) which is about 26% more but in both cases most of the data can be stored on clouds.
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In summary, the preprocessing step is the DWT-2D based on “Le Gall 5/3” filter which
is designed to be an integer-to-integer map, such that the DWT is lossless. As a result, on
one hand, any rounding error is avoided; on the other hand, the extra storage space usage
caused by the int to f loat conversion does not exist. Moreover, in our design, we consider
any kind of data type as int with bit-length of 8 bits. That is to say, no matter what kind of
original data type it is, we process the data by reading one byte one time and deal with it as
an 8-bit integer. Then the input bytes will form an "image" (2D matrix) of a configurable
size ready for the whole SE process. In this process, the storage method of output data is
carefully designed to provide integrity for any kind of input data.
5.3 Security analysis
A secure encryption algorithm ought to resist a various array of classic attacks [111, 29]. In
this section, different security tests on the proposed scheme are performed to establish its
high level of security.
The basic assumption is that the selected private fragment of data can easily be secured
by using AES-128 (also, it is easy to replace AES-128 with any other encryption algorithms
as in Fig. 5.4), so the security property of this private fragment is not analyzed here either it
is stored locally or for further securing sharing.
To validate a vast deployment (robustness) of the proposed method, the public and
protected fragment which is stored on clouds in our use case are analyzed in terms of security
performance to verify whether it reaches the required cryptographic performance. In Fig.5.4,
the design is to put the two public and protected fragments on clouds. Thus, only these two
fragments should be analyzed. However, according to our work, the security property of the
1st public and protected fragment is very similar to the 2nd public and protected fragment so
we only present the results for the 2nd public and protected fragment here.
In the following, we present the figures for the security analysis and all statistical results
for an image, three kinds of video files, and English texts can be found in Table 5.1, Table 5.3,
and Table 5.2 respectively. As long as the video and text files are larger than single image
files, the statistical results for the videos and texts are the average one of 100 randomly
picked chunks (chunk size 1024KB) inside the video file contents. Some criteria like PSNR
and SSIM just suit for measuring images while not for text files.
Here the analysis measures on original data chunk and public and protected fragment
used following are given: 1. Uniformity analysis is given by calculating the Probability
Density Function (PDF); 2. Information entropy analysis is given by calculating the Entropy;
3. Correlation analysis is given by calculating correlation coefficients; 4. Difference analysis
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is to test the difference in bit level and also the Normalized Mutual Information (NMI);
5. Sensitivity analysis is given by calculating the sensitivity when input plain-text and key
changes; 6. Visual Degradation analysis is only for bitmaps by calculating Peak Signal-
to-Noise Ratio (PSNR) and Structural Similarity (SSIM); 7. Errors propagation is also
discussed.
Table 5.1 Statistical results of sensitivity for public and protected fragment (stored in Cloud)
for Lenna image.
Statistical results for images
Min Mean Max Std
PSNR 9.1943 9.2303 9.2616 0.0093
SSIM 0.03 0.0359 0.0412 0.0016
Di f 49.8886 49.9990 50.1077 0.0351
KS 49.8943 50.0011 50.1280 0.0347
ρ2 0.0189 0.0193 0.0196 0.0001
ρ−h -0.0614 0.0002 0.0492 0.0156
ρ− v -0.0515 0.0001 0.0522 0.0154
ρ−d -0.0448 0.0005 0.0580 0.0157
NMI 0.0189 0.0193 0.0197 0.0027
Table 5.2 Statistical results of sensitivity for public and protected fragment (stored in Cloud)
for a English text (ASCII coding).
Statistical results for texts
Min Mean Max Std
Di f 49.7008 50.0042 50.3350 0.0992
KS 49.7417 49.9978 50.4112 0.1030
ρ -0.0145 0.0002 0.0192 0.0055
NMI 0.0669 0.0685 0.0701 0.0005
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Table 5.3 Statistical results of sensitivity for public and protected fragment (stored in Cloud)
for videos.
Statistical results for MP4
Min Mean Max Std
Di f 49.8211 49.9918 50.1684 0.0632
ρ -0.0098 -0.0004 0.0078 0.0031
NMI 0.1005 0.1145 0.1198 0.0018
Statistical results for MKV
Min Mean Max Std
Di f 49.9985 49.8323 50.2008 0.0731
ρ -0.0090 0.0001 0.0085 0.0039
NMI 0.1010 0.1027 0.1035 0.0067
Statistical results for RMVB
Min Mean Max Std
Di f 49.8344 49.9994 50.1013 0.0792
ρ -0.0096 -0.0005 0.0112 0.0037
NMI 0.2616 0.2745 0.2773 0.0022
5.3.1 Uniformity Analysis
The encrypted data should possess certain random properties such as uniformity, which is
essential to resist against frequency attacks. Accordingly, the Probability Density Func-
tion(PDF) of the public and protected fragment should be as uniform as possible. This means
that each symbol (pixels in image case) has an occurrence probability close to 1n , where n is
the number of symbols ( 1256 = 0.0039 in byte level). We start by analyzing the image data
and then other data to prove that the proposed method can attain the uniformity independently
for its public and protected fragment.
The original plain image Lenna and its corresponding PDF are shown in Fig. 5.6-(a),(b).
While, in Fig. 5.6-(c),(d), the corresponding fragment stored in cloud (c) to their corre-
sponding PDF (d) is shown, respectively. It can be observed that the PDF of the public and
protected fragment is close to uniform distribution since the probability of different symbols
in the PDF figure are very different with the original one and tends to be uniform.
Also, in Fig. 5.7, the byte representation (read the data chunk byte by byte and form the
matrix with each element is the value of the byte before DWT-2D) of an original chosen
text file is presented in (a) and its corresponding PDF in (b) in addition to its corresponding
fragment byte representation that is stored in cloud (c) and with its corresponding PDF (d).
The obtained result indicates that the public and protected fragment of the text file posses also
a uniform distribution. The similar results can be observed in Fig.5.8, Fig.5.9, and Fig.5.10.
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From these results, we have shown that the distribution of the public and protected
fragment tends to the uniform one no matter of the input data type. For the video cases, as
long as the input chunks are video file contents which are already compressed and encoded,
the original byte representations have no visual information. But the PDF of the public and
protected fragments correspondingly have shown a tend of uniform distribution.
Moreover, to validate this result, an entropy test is realized in the sub-matrix level of size
8×8 (same size of the input block).
Fig. 5.6 (a) Original Lenna, (b) PDF of original Lenna512, (c) Public and protected fragment,
(d) PDF of public and protected fragment.
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Fig. 5.7 Randomly chosen original text byte representation (a) and its PDF (b), Corresponding
protected and public fragment (c) with its PDF (d).
Fig. 5.8 Randomly chosen original MP4 file byte representation (a) and its PDF (b), Corre-
sponding protected and public fragment (c) with its PDF (d).
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Fig. 5.9 Randomly chosen original MKV file byte representation (a) and its PDF (b), Corre-
sponding protected and public fragment (c) with its PDF (d).
Fig. 5.10 Randomly chosen original RMVB file byte representation (a) and its PDF (b),
Corresponding protected and public fragment (c) with its PDF (d).
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5.3.2 Information Entropy Analysis
The information entropy of a data sequence M is a parameter that measures the level of
uncertainty in a random variable [181] and is expressed in bits, defined using equation (5.6):
H(m) =−
n
∑
i=1
p(mi) log2
1
p(mi)
(5.6)
where p(mi) denotes the probability of symbol mi. It is easy to calculate for a random
source emitting 2N symbols, the entropy should be N. In this design, as the data are always
seen as 8-bit per element, the pixel data have 28 possible values. As such, the entropy for a
"true random" information source must be 8. For the bitmap case, the entropy of the public
and protected fragments for different images are always more than 7.999 which proves high
randomness.
In this subsection, the entropy tests are done on the public and protected fragments for
not only bitmap files but also for English text files and three different video formats. For
each file formats, 100 data chunks (each one is 1MB) are randomly chosen for the entropy
test. As shown in Table5.4 and Fig.5.11-(d), the public and protected fragment of text chunks
always have high randomness with entropy values are always between 7.9992 to 7.9995.
Table 5.4 Entropy test for 100 random chunks for videos and texts.
Entropy test results for videos and texts.
Min Mean Max Std
text(original) 4.5961 4.6423 4.6938 0.0239
text(protected) 7.9992 7.9993 7.9995 0.0000
mkv(original) 7.96399 7.99726 7.99928 0.0055
mkv(protected) 7.99916 7.99930 7.99945 0.00006
rmvb(original) 7.91174 7.96303 7.98120 0.13383
rmvb(protected) 7.99914 7.99930 7.99944 0.00006
mp4(original) 7.99467 7.99851 7.99930 0.0006
mp4(protected) 7.99912 7.99930 7.99941 0.00005
As long as video files are already compressed, encoded and formatted, the entropy of
the original video data chunks are already close to 8. However, in Table5.4 and Fig.5.11-
(a),(b),(c), there are still improvements of the randomness for the three video formats.
Therefore, the proposed scheme can achieve a very low entropy effect that can resist an attack
based on entropy analysis for the file formats tested.
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Fig. 5.11 Entropy test results distribution for 100 random chunks for videos and texts: (a)
mkv, (b) mp4, (c) rmvb, and (d) text.
5.3.3 Test Correlation between Original and protected and public frag-
ments
Lower correlation between original data and public and protected fragment is an important
factor that allows validating the independence between them. Having a correlation coefficient
close to zero means that the high degree of randomness is obtained. The correlation coefficient
rxy is calculated using the following equations (5.8):
rxy =
cov(x,y)√
D(x)×D(y) (5.7)
where
E(x) =
1
N
×
N
∑
i=1
xi
D(x) =
1
N
×
N
∑
i=1
(xi−E(x))2
cov(x,y) =
1
N
×
N
∑
i=1
(xi−E(x))(yi−E(y))
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In this test, we use image, text and video files as input for analyzing correlation. Indeed,
the variation of coefficient correlation between original data and the public and protected
fragment is obtained by applying the upper equations and the result is shown in Table 5.1,
Table 5.2, and Table 5.3 (see value distribution of ρ2 for image case and ρ for text and
video case). The obtained result indicates that the coefficient correlation varies in a small
interval very close to 0. This means that low correlation coefficient is attained by employing
the proposed scheme and consequently the independence between the original data and the
fragment is attained.
Additionally, to validate that the spacial redundancy is removed [108, 131], for the
image case, the correlation between pixels of original image and the public and protected
fragment are performed. This test selects randomly N = 4096 pairs of two adjacent pixels in
horizontal, vertical, and diagonal direction. The obtained results are presented in Fig. 5.12,
for the original (a)-(c) and the fragment (d)-(f) in horizontal, vertical and diagonal direction,
respectively (same for text file from (g) to (l)). The result in this figure indicates clearly the
high correlation between adjacent pixels in original image (correlation coefficient close to
1). While, for the public and protected fragment, the correlation coefficients become very
low (close to 0) which clearly shows that the proposed scheme reduces severely the spatial
redundancy.
Moreover, the variation of the correlation coefficient between adjacent pixels of public
and protected fragment of Lenna image versus 1000 random keys are shown in Table 5.1
( ρ − h, ρ − d, ρ − v respectively). The results are close to 0, which confirms that spatial
redundancy is almost eliminated and very little detectable relation can be found in the public
and protected fragment for both image and text case. Similar results are obtained using text
file as input (see Fig. 5.12 (g)-(l)). For the video cases, the results in Table 5.3 are the average
values for 100 randomly picked chunks.
5.3.4 Difference Between input Data and the public and protected frag-
ment
The public and protected fragment must be statistically different from the original data (50%)
in bit level. The proposed scheme has achieved a high value of difference before and after
process for all data formats tested. For example, the plain image Lenna was tested and the
obtained result in Fig. 5.13-(a) shows that 50% of bits is being changed between the public
and protected fragment and the plain image. Additionally, similar result is obtained for text
and video files, and statistical value is shown in Table 5.2 and Table 5.3(see value distribution
of Di f for all cases).
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Fig. 5.12 Correlation distribution in adjacent pixels in original Lenna: (a) horizontally, (b)
vertically, (c) diagonally.
Correlation in adjacent pixels in the public and protected fragment:(d) horizontally, (e)
vertically, (f) diagonally.
Correlation distribution in adjacent pixels in text:(g) horizontally, (h) vertically, (i) diagonally.
Correlation in adjacent pixels in the public and protected fragment: (j) horizontally, (k)
vertically, (l) diagonally.
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Fig. 5.13 Difference (a) and NMI (b) between original Lenna and the public and protected
fragment versus 1000 random different keys.
To confirm this result, we also applied the Normalized Mutual Information (NMI) [160]
between the original data blocks and public and protected fragments and the obtained results
(for 1000 random secret keys: image case in Fig. 5.13-(b), Table 5.1 and text case in Table 5.2;
for 100 randomly picked data chunks: video case in Table 5.3) shows that NMI value is
always close to 0. Consequently, this indicates that no detectable information can be extracted
from the public and protected fragment.
5.3.5 Sensitivity Test
Differential attacks are based on studying the relation between two encrypted data resulting
from a slight change like usually one different bit in the original plain-image or in the key. A
successful sensitivity test shows how much a slight change will affect the cipher data. In other
words, the higher the ciphered data changes when slight change happens in input, the better
sensitivity of the encryption algorithm is. Here we analyze different types of sensitivity.
For the Plain-text Sensitivity, it is designed that in current version, the very similar
blocks will have the very different public and protected fragments due to the randomness
introduced by SHA algorithms. In fact, as long as most file transmitted on Internet are
compressed and formatted, many same blocks within one chunk are rare to see. For this
specific case, a counter (nouce) could be added as the input of the SHA algorithm in Fig.5.4
to generate different output for the same input blocks.
Concerning the Key Sensitivity tests, it is one of the most important tests and permits
to quantify its sensitivity against any slight change in the secret key. In fact, for the private
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fragment, the encryption algorithm used (AES-128) could meet such sensitivity requirement.
For the public and protected fragments, to study the key sensitivity, two secret keys are
used : SK1 and SK2 that differ in only one random bit. The two plain images are processed
separately and the Hamming distance of the corresponding public and protected fragments
C1 and C2 is computed and also for the chosen text file (same methods used in [48]), and
illustrated as Table 5.1 (see KS for both cases) versus 1000 tests.
Fig. 5.14 Sensitivity tests for Lenna and text versus 1000 random different keys.
It is seen that the obtained values are always close to the optimal value (about 50% bits
changes when 1 bit change in the key) for both input data as shown in Fig.5.14. This indicates
that the proposed method ensures high sensitivity against any tiny change in the secret key.
Similar results are obtained for the three video files used.
5.3.6 Visual Degradation for images
This test is specific for image that permits to quantify the visual degradation that is reached
by employing a protection scheme. In fact, the degradation operated on the original image
must be done in way that the visual content presented in the protected image must not be
recognized. Two well known parameters are studied to measure the encryption visual quality
which are Peak Signal-to-Noise Ratio (PSNR) [73] and Structural Similarity (SSIM) [168].
PSNR is derived from the Mean Squared Error (MSE), while MSE represents the cumu-
lative squared error between two images. A low PSNR value [73] indicates that there is a
high difference between the original image and the public and protected fragment.
Concerning SSIM [89], it is defined after the Human Visual System (HVS) has evolved
so that we can extract the structural information from the scene. SSIM is in the interval [0,1]
and a value of 0 means that there is no correlation between the original image and the public
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Fig. 5.15 PSNR and SSIM variation between original Lenna image and the corresponding
public and protected fragment versus 1000 different keys.
and protected fragment, while a value close to 1 means that the two images are approximately
the same. PSNR and SSIM are measured between the original Lenna image and its public and
protected fragment for 1000 different keys and corresponding value distribution presented in
Fig. 5.15, respectively. The mean PSNR value is 9.23 dB which validates that the proposed
scheme provides a high difference in visual between the original image and its public and
protected fragment. Also, the SSIM value did not exceed 0.036, which means that a high
and hard visual distortion is obtained.
As a conclusion, the proposed scheme ensures a hard visual degradation. This means that
no useful visual information or structure about the original image could be revealed from the
protected and public fragments.
5.3.7 Propagation of errors
Indeed, an important criteria that should be ensured for any protection scheme is the error
propagation while data is transmitted. The interference and noise in the transmission channel
might cause errors. Bit error means that a substitution of ’0’ bit into ’1’ bit or vice versa. This
error may propagate and lead to the destruction of decrypting data, which is a big challenge
since a trade-off between avalanche effect and error propagation are shown in [101]. In
this proposal, if a bit error takes place in sub-matrix of the public and protected fragment,
the error will propagate randomly only in its corresponding sub matrix and will not affect
its consecutive corresponding neighbour sub-matrix. Moreover, as we discussed before,
in Fig. 5.4, the 1st public and protected fragment can also be stored locally so when the
communication channel is unreliable and transmission error occurs, the 2nd public and
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protected fragment are the only one that is affected. In this case, the defragmenting process
is the XORing between the correct SHA-512 result of 1st public and protected fragment and
2nd public and protected fragment with errors. Thus, the decrypting 2nd public and protected
fragment will have 1 bit error if there is 1 bit error in the transmitted 2nd public and protected
fragment. As a result, we can conclude that in such communication channel, this design of
dispersion is efficient to prevent the error propagation.
5.3.8 Cryptanalysis Discussion: Resistance against well-known types
of attacks
In this subsection, typical published cryptanalytic cases are considered and a brief analysis
of the proposed scheme against several cryptanalytic attacks is provided from a cryptanalysis
viewpoint. The proposed method is considered to be public and the attacker has complete
knowledge to all steps but no knowledge about the secret key.
The strength of the proposed scheme against attacks is based on the existing cipher
systems we deployed.
For the private fragment, AES has key space that can be 2128, 2192 or 2256, which is
sufficiently large to make the brute-force attack almost infeasible. Furthermore, differential
and linear attacks would become ineffective. For the public and protected fragments, SHA-
256 and SHA-512 guarantee the randomness. In fact, any change in any bit of the secret
key causes a significant difference in the produced public and protected fragment as seen in
Table 5.1. Hence, a key is used for every block (shown in Fig. 5.4) and as the difficulty of
cipher-text-only attack is equal to one of the brute force attacks, it becomes impossible for a
cipher-text-only attack to retrieve useful information from the public and protected fragment
in our scheme.
For further cases like single plain-text failure and accidental key disclosure, Initialization
Vector (IV) could be introduced to generate dynamic keys for each of the chunk. In such
case, it is very difficult for an attacker to recover the dynamic secret key that is changed for
every input chunk.
With regard to resisting the statistical attacks, the proposed approach achieves that the
plain-text are changed in positions and values, which means that the confusion and diffusion
properties are ensured in addition. An example is illustrated in Fig. 5.16, where a 8× 8
matrix of the original Lenna image and its public and protected fragment are illustrated by
values. This result demonstrates that all values are changed. Therefore, the randomness
property is ensured and this consequently permits to prevent the reverse-attack algorithm.
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Fig. 5.16 (a) 8×8 cropped plain matrix with its corresponding gray scale matrix, (b) public
and protected fragment of this matrix using the proposed scheme with its gray scale value.
More importantly, the spatial redundancy between adjacent elements of input plain data
are removed and a high randomness degree of the whole fragment are proved. Different
statistical tests such as the entropy analysis, probability density function, correlation tests are
applied to validate the independence and uniformity property. Consequently, these results
indicate that no useful information can be detected from the public and protected fragment.
This validates the robustness of the proposed scheme and their high resistance to statistical
attacks.
Moreover, key sensitivity analysis demonstrates the efficiency of the proposed scheme
against related key attacks, while any change in any one bit of key provide a different (50%)
public and protected fragment.
5.4 Benchmark with two computer architectures
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the whole protection process. As we are
considering the allocation of the calculations on a PC platform, the hardware resource we
have are a CPU and a GPGPU. However, the very different calculation capacities of GPGPU
change the whole execution time of SE [107] [115]. So, the performance is evaluated in two
typical use cases that are a laptop equipped with a low-end GPU and a desktop equipped
with a high-end GPU.
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Table 5.5 Performance evaluation for every calculation tasks of SE for two platforms.
Input chunk size (byte) 1024×1024 2048×2048 3200×3200 4800×4800
Laptop
Scenario
GPU time (DWT-2D) 1.39ms 4.87ms 12.6ms 24.1ms
GPU time (SHA-256) 0.33ms 1.31ms 3.3ms 7.3ms
GPU time (SHA-512) 1.45ms 5.8ms 14.2ms 31.8ms
CPU time (AES-128) 0.29ms 1.14ms 3.06ms 6.67ms
desktop
Scenario
GPU time (DWT-2D) 0.34ms 0.79ms 1.7ms 3.3ms
GPU time (SHA-256) 0.05ms 0.13ms 0.29ms 0.63ms
GPU time (SHA-512) 0.13ms 0.69ms 1.58ms 3.2ms
CPU time (AES-128) 0.23ms 0.96ms 2.37ms 5.3ms
The key decision of the design is to distribute the calculation tasks between the GPU
and the CPU. As pointed in Section 2.3.2, the DWT-2D, SHA-256 and SHA-512 can benefit
from the GPU acceleration, so the design is based on the parallel execution of CPU with
GPU while the GPU will take calculation tasks of DWT-2D, SHA-256 and SHA-512 in the
process, CPU takes AES-128 for only private fragment. The initial plan for both low-end
and high-end GPU cases is to keep the GPU busy and CPU would have time space for other
tasks ( Fig. 5.17).
For the laptop, there is an Intel I7-3630QM CPU and a Nvidia Nvs 5200M GPU. For the
desktop, we have a CPU of Intel I7-4770K and a GPU of Nvidia Geforce gtx 780. In order
to verify our initial plan and allocate the right calculation tasks to the right chip, we evaluate
each of the tasks on laptop and desktop and results are shown in Table 5.5. For different size
of input data chunk, the execution time of GPU for the second input data chunk can always
overlap the execution time of CPU for the selected DWT-2D coefficients of the first input
data chunk.
Fig. 5.17 Time overlapping architecture of the implementation.
From the two use cases we evaluated, the overlay design in Fig. 5.17 works. And the
speed of the whole SE process relies on how fast the GPU can process its calculation tasks on
input data as long as there are many chunks as input. That is to say, in these two scenarios, the
time consumed by GPU is evaluated as the benchmark for our SE method. The calculation
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speed of our scheme evaluated for this laptop scenario is about 360 MB/s and for this desktop
scenario is about 2.8-3.2GB/s.
5.5 Discussion for benchmark
As shown in Table 3.1 in Chapter 3, the desktop GPU we used contains 2304 CUDA cores
compared with the 96 CUDA cores on the laptop GPU. It is easy to conclude calculation
speed of the desktop GPU is much faster than the laptop GPU which is a common scenario
for different GPUs. As a consequence, Speed of the SE method is very different for the two
PC scenarios as shown before. This very difference exists on the two typical hardware cases:
low-end GPUs normally for laptops and high-end GPUs for desktops or gaming PCs.
Fig. 5.18 Performance evaluations for SE compared with full AES on laptop and desktop
scenarios.
In fact, as long as GPU architectures are rapidly evolving, the hardware configuration of
a GPU may strongly influence software applications architectural choices necessary to derive
the best possible implementation. This point could even invert the results of our evaluation
since a large number of cores could very well favor the GPU calculation tasks that finally
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change the overlay design. Also as pointed by [66], when a GPU calculation capacity is
very high, bottleneck of the process is the memory transfer between the GPU memory and
the host memory instead of calculation speed itself. This is mainly due to the limitation of
transmission speed through the PCIE bus (Peripheral Component Interconnect Express [20])
between host memory and GPU memory. This problem can be avoided by arranging more
calculation tasks on GPU instead of too much I/O usage or overlapping the transmission by
execution time.
Here we presented the comparison of the SE method with the traditional CPU-only AES-
128 speed ([37]) in Fig. 5.18. It is worth noticed that [17] pointed out that the CPU-only
AES could also be very fast with the support of the New Instructions extension (NI) brought
by Intel. This AES-NI could accelerate the AES on CPU for more than 5 times and achieve
almost 3GB/s on a NI-enable CPU (shown in Fig. 5.18) which is almost the same speed as
our method based on GPGPU. However, as pointed out in the Nvidia white paper [109], the
Nvidia GeForce 1080 GPU (released in 2016) is already three times faster than the GPU used
in this thesis (Nvidia GeForce 780, released in 2013), it is only fair to say the performance
gain could be larger with employing the start-of-the-art GPGPU. Such rapid evolving in
hardware is not seen in recent years’ CPU manufacturing. In conclusion, our design on GPU
could always achieve better performance than AES-NI on CPU with fair hardware.
5.6 Fragment transmission
This data protection method can be also used for secure data transmission and sharing
between end-users. This design could generates three fragments for data sharing for each of
the data chunk as shown in Fig.5.19. For the private fragment, the encryption algorithm used
in this particular design is AES-128 (could be easily replaced by AES-NI with a NI-enabled
CPU or any other encryption algorithms). This private fragment is the only fragment that
is directly transmitted between end-users. The other two protected and public fragments
are transmitted through the public cloud servers without leaking information. The storage
space that the private fragment takes is 7.8% of the original data size, while the 1st and 2nd
protected and public fragments take 24.2% and 93.8% of the original data storage space
respectively.
Although the total data storage space usage is about 25% larger than the original one,
the local storage space usage is only 7.8% which highly reduces the local storage usage and
exploit the convenience brought by the Cloud servers with both efficiency and security.
Fig.5.20 gives an example for using this method for data sharing between end-users. The
sender processes the fragmentation and protection before sending to the Clouds. The 1st and
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Fig. 5.19 Three fragments from one data chunk for further securing data sharing.
2nd protected and public fragments will be sent to different Cloud servers and be available
for any receiver to download at anytime. The private fragment will be sent through direct
communication channel between senders and receivers.
Fig. 5.20 Use case: secure data sharing between end-users through different Cloud servers
based on fragmentation and dispersion.
The first advantage of this design is to largely reduce the local storage space usage while
providing security and privacy for the end-user. This is specially useful in some use cases
like when the end-user device is a mobile phone (local storage space is limited and expensive
compared with the free large Cloud storage space). The second one is to efficiently process
the fragmentation and protection solely on end-user’s device which avoid any plain data
transmission on insecure channel and could avoid using specific service provided by server
end like BlackBerry Enterprise Server (BES) [25]. More importantly, as pointed out by [27]
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and [184], DWT could be accelerated by mobile GPU which allows possible usage of this
scheme in future when GPGPUs are largely deployed on smart phones.
Chapter 6
Conclusion and future work
In this thesis, a data protection scheme combining fragmentation, encryption and dispersion is
presented based on improvement of selective encryption algorithms. In the past two decades,
most SE algorithms, were initially dedicated to SE specific multimedia. They are based
upon one of the steps for formatting compressing the content (transformation, encoding, and
packeting).
From previous works, SE methods provides mainly more efficiency compared with
traditional full encryption methods by protecting only a part of original data. However, this
thesis points out that SE methods do not always provide efficiency considering the rapid
evolution of both algorithms and hardware (pointed out in Chapter 3). Thus, an architecture
according to existing different hardware configurations (the recent evolvement of hardware
should be considered to fit in the frame and the scheme has the adaptivity for very different
environments) is discussed including a flexible software architecture (the algorithms deployed
could be easily replaced by the new ones while the main framework of the scheme remains
the same).
In Chapter 4, two levels of Bitmap protection schemes are presented both using DCT 8×8
preprocessing and GPGPU acceleration. We defined a first level of lightweight protection with
a very fast speed and a second level of strong protection with a good protection quality. For
the second level of protection, many detailed designs are implemented for less information
loss and avoiding recursive rounding error which improved the previous bitmap-related
SE methods. Fragmentation is used in this scheme with an additional optimized memory
allocation and transmission.
In Chapter 5, an agnostic SE architecture is presented based on lossless DWT 8× 8
preprocessing. The initial motivation of this architecture is to solve the question of integrity
for bitmap images. Then we realized that this method could deal with text format. And we
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verified that in fact it is agnostic with regard to the format of the information to be protected
at the difference of any SE method that we have been able to see in the current literature.
The proposed architecture employs the AES encryption algorithm to protect the private
fragment that will be stored locally in the use case. It can be easily replaced by using other
encryption algorithms like AES-NI instead. For the other fragments, SHA algorithms are
used to produce a key-stream that will be employed to encrypt the public and protected
fragment by mixing them. The SHA will guarantee the randomness of the key-streams
generated even from the very similar neighbour 8×8 blocks which can provide the needed
protection for the public and protected fragments.
More importantly, GPGPU is employed to reduce the overhead of applying the optimiza-
tion DWT-2D operation, and sometimes both the AES and SHA operations. The architecture
is flexible for different hardware configurations with the pure GPGPU experimentation and
CPU with GPGPU overlay design. In order to validate that the proposed design can ensure
the required goals, a benchmark was realized between the proposed experimentation and a
full AES encryption for different kinds of data on two very different hardware platforms.
And several experimental and theoretical security analysis were realized to prove the security,
robustness and resistance against error propagation.
Therefore, the proposed solution can be considered as an agnostic selective encryption
algorithm candidate that can be applied for most computer distributed systems in particular,
we can use this method to store large amount of data in public clouds in a secure manner.
For future work, we propose considering to reconsider the design for redefining the
important private fragment. According to recent work, the low frequency coefficients in
transformations (like DWT 8×8 used in this thesis) are not necessarily more "important"
than the high frequency coefficients. In fact, for agnostic fashion data protection schemes,
a practical way to measure the importance of transformation coefficients is to calculate the
influence of input values to the coefficients. For instance, some low frequency coefficients
are related to only a small subset of input values (the change of rest input values will not lead
to the change of these low frequency coefficients) while some high frequency coefficients
can be related to more input values. This fact would give us a hint about how to define
more "important" fragments by choosing those coefficients that are related to all input values
ignoring how low or high frequencies are.
Regarding the implementation aspect, the non-general-purpose mobile GPU platforms
should be experimented to fit the architecture of the proposed agnostic SE method to achieve
both performance efficiency and energy saving purposes on today’s smart phones. And,
of course, more kinds of personal computer GPGPU platforms (such as multiple CPUs or
GPGPUs platforms or newest generation hardware) should be experimented with deriving a
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general solution for the allocation between CPUs and GPGPUs. As pointed out in former dis-
cussion, the evolution of hardware configuration never stops and sometimes the deployment
of new hardware would totally change the software design.
At last, there are some future work regarding fragment dispersion and transmission with
an environment based on user device and public and clouds. More standards like availability,
data recovery should be taken into consideration for a more adaptable architecture.
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